Can a machine be conscious? How?

Harnad, Stevan (2003) Can a machine be conscious? How? [Journal (Paginated)]

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A "machine" is any causal physical system, hence we are machines, hence machines can be conscious. The question is: which kinds of machines can be conscious? Chances are that robots that can pass the Turing Test -- completely indistinguishable from us in their behavioral capacities -- can be conscious (i.e. feel), but we can never be sure (because of the "other-minds" problem). And we can never know HOW they have minds, because of the "mind/body" problem. We can only know how they pass the Turing Test, but not how, why or whether that makes them feel.

Item Type:Journal (Paginated)
Keywords:artificial intelligence, consciousness, Turing Test, mind/body problem, other-mind problem, artificial life
Subjects:Neuroscience > Neural Modelling
Psychology > Cognitive Psychology
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
Computer Science > Robotics
Biology > Theoretical Biology
ID Code:5330
Deposited By: Harnad, Stevan
Deposited On:22 Dec 2006
Last Modified:19 Nov 2015 23:48

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References in Article

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