Cogprints: No conditions. Results ordered Title. 2018-01-17T14:21:47ZEPrintshttp://cogprints.org/images/sitelogo.gifhttp://cogprints.org/1998-06-21Z2011-03-11T08:53:58Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/469This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4691998-06-21ZAnalysis of a computer model of emotionsIn the fields of psychology, AI, and philosophy there has recently been theoretical activity in the cognitively-based modelling of emotions. Using AI methodology it is possible to implement and test these complex models, and in this paper we examine an emotion model called ACRES. We propose a set of requirements any such model should satisfy, and compare ACRES against them. Then, analysing its behaviour in detail, we formulate more requirements and criteria that can be applied to future computational models of emotion. In arguing to support the new requirements, we find that they are desirable for autonomous systems in general. We also show how they can explain the psychological concept of regulation. Finally, we use the concepts developed to make a theoretical distinction between emotion and motivation.D. MoffatN.H. FrijdaR.H. Phaf2001-05-29Z2011-03-11T08:54:39Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1518This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/15182001-05-29ZANTLIMA -- A Listener Model with Mental ImagesAI research concerning the connection between seeing and speaking mainly employs what is often called reference semantics. Applying this approach to the situation of a radio sports reporter, we have to coordinate the demand of referentially anchoring an utterance dealing with the visually perceived, and the demand for coherence of an utterance as part of a verbal interaction with somebody not situated in the same perceptual context. In consequence, we are led to the conception of a speaker anticipating the listeners' understanding by means of mental images which replace the percepts being described, and thus provide the referents for the audience. We present a system realizing this type of partner modeling, emphasizing mainly the reconstruction of the referents, i.e., of a mental image. Starting from the thesis that the audience expects the speaker to mean the most typical case of the described class of events or situations with respect to the communicated context, we explain a mechanism for representing and using typicality distributions of static spatial relations which is related to Herskovits' analytical framework. Extended to restrictions of speed and temporal duration, this mechanism also allows us to construct dynamic mental images corresponding to the referents of objective sports reports.
Jörg R.J. SchirraEva Stopp2008-05-11T02:48:24Z2011-03-11T08:57:07Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6042This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/60422008-05-11T02:48:24ZApproach-Avoidance Behavior of Refugees in a Finnish SchoolThe purpose of the study was to research how the Vietnamese refugees
(N was 9) behave with a Finnish school environment. Participating observation
was applied because of the lack of public possibilities to study the phenomenon
openly. The Markovian approach was the analysis of the data. The results
indicate school environment, its interaction guides how the refugees behave in
their approach-avoidance behavior. Principally, the behavior of the surrounding
school environment produces ambivalence into the behavior of the refugeesEd.D. Raimo J Laasonenpostmaster@rjl.pp.fi2001-06-18Z2011-03-11T08:54:41Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1587This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/15872001-06-18ZArtificial Life: Synthetic Versus VirtualArtificial life can take two forms: synthetic and virtual. In principle, the materials and properties of synthetic
living systems could differ radically from those of natural living systems yet still resemble them enough to be really alive if they
are grounded in the relevant causal interactions with the real world. Virtual (purely computational) "living" systems, in contrast,
are just ungrounded symbol systems that are systematically interpretable as if they were alive; in reality they are no more alive
than a virtual furnace is hot. Virtual systems are better viewed as "symbolic oracles" that can be used (interpreted) to predict and
explain real systems, but not to instantiate them. The vitalistic overinterpretation of virtual life is related to the animistic
overinterpretation of virtual minds and is probably based on an implicit (and possibly erroneous) intuition that living things have
actual or potential mental lives. Stevan Harnad1998-06-23Z2011-03-11T08:53:44Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/203This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2031998-06-23ZBABY-SIT: A Computational Medium Based on SituationsWhile situation theory and situation semantics provide an appropriate framework for a realistic model-theoretic treatment of natural language, serious thinking on their `computational' aspects has just started. Existing proposals mainly offer a Prolog- or Lisp-like programming environment with varying degrees of divergence from the ontology of situation theory. In this paper, we introduce a computational medium (called BABY-SIT) based on situations. The primary motivation underlying BABY-SIT is to facilitate the development and testing of programs in domains ranging from linguistics to artificial intelligence in a unified framework built upon situation-theoretic constructs.Erkan TinVarol Akman1998-04-14Z2011-03-11T08:53:47Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/271This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2711998-04-14ZBack from the Drawing BoardReading these essays has shown me a great deal, both about the substantive issues I have dealt with and about how to do philosophy. On the former front, they show that I have missed some points and overstated others, and sometimes just been unable to penetrate the fog. On the latter front, they show how hard it is to write philosophy that works--and this is the point that stands out for me as I reflect on these rich and varied essays. Philosophical books and articles routinely fail to achieve their manifest goal of persuading their intended audiences of their main points. Does this make philosophy any worse off than other writing endeavors? Most published novels are failures of one sort or another, and the press has reported a recent study (whose methodology I wonder about) that concludes that the median number of readers of any paper published in a psychology journal is zero. But it seems to me that philosophy displays a particularly feckless record, with such a huge gap between authorial pretense and effect achieved that it is perhaps more comic than pathetic. In one weak moment I found myself thinking that perhaps some of our French colleagues have the right idea: deliberate obscurantism and the striking of stylized poses--since the goal of persuading by clear, precise analysis and argument is so manifestly beyond us. But that worldly weariness passed, I'm happy to say, and my cock-eyed American optimism returned. My ambition continues to be to change people's minds, and not just to win people over to my way of doing philosophy, as Bo Dahlbom suggests. But I admit that it is harder than I had thought. It's hard enough to get a good idea, but sometimes it's even harder, apparently, to get others to see what the idea is, and why it's good.Daniel C. Dennett1998-05-07Z2011-03-11T08:53:37Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/33This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/331998-05-07ZBi- and Multivariate Analyses of Diallel Crosses: A Tool for the Genetic Dissection of Neurobehavioral PhenotypesThe genetic-correlational approach provides a very powerful tool for the analysis of causal relationships between phenotypes. It appears to be particularly appropriate for investigating the functional organization of behavior and/or of causal relationships between brain and behavior. A method for the bivariate analysis of diallel crosses that permits the estimation of correlations due to environmental effects, additive-genetic effects, and/or dominance deviations is described, together with a worked-out example stemming from a five times replicated 4 x 4 diallel cross between inbred mouse strains. The phenotypes chosen to illustrate the analysis were locomotor activity and rearing frequency in an open field. Large, positive additive-genetic and dominance correlations between these two phenotypes were obtained. This finding was replicated in another, independently-executed, diallel cross.Wim E. Crusio1998-07-02Z2011-03-11T08:53:59Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/489This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4891998-07-02ZBook Review -- Peter D. Mosses, Action SemanticsThis is a review of Action Semantics, by Peter D. Mosses, published by Cambridge University Press in 1992.Varol Akman1998-04-14Z2011-03-11T08:53:47Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/276This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2761998-04-14ZCaveat Emptor (reply to essays on Consciousness Explained - reply to Mangan, Toribio, Baars and McGovern) inWhat I find particularly valuable in the juxtaposition of these three essays on my book is the triangulation made possible by their different versions of much the same story. I present my view as a product of cognitive science, but all three express worries that it may involve some sort of ominous backsliding towards the evils of behaviorism. I agree with Baars and McGovern when they suggest that philosophy has had some baleful influences on psychology during this century. Logical positivism at its best was full of subtle softenings, but behaviorist psychologists bought the tabloid version, and sold it to their students in large quantities. George Miller's account of those dreary days is not an exaggeration, and the effects still linger in some quarters. (Philosophers are often amused--but they should really be disconcerted--to note that the only living, preaching logical positivists today are to be found in psychology departments.)Daniel Dennett1998-06-15Z2011-03-11T08:53:49Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/319This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3191998-06-15ZA Computational Foundation for the Study of CognitionComputation is central to the foundations of modern cognitive science, but its role is controversial. Questions about computation abound: What is it for a physical system to implement a computation? Is computation sufficient for thought? What is the role of computation in a theory of cognition? What is the relation between different sorts of computational theory, such as connectionism and symbolic computation? In this paper I develop a systematic framework that addresses all of these questions. Justifying the role of computation requires analysis of implementation, the nexus between abstract computations and concrete physical systems. I give such an analysis, based on the idea that a system implements a computation if the causal structure of the system mirrors the formal structure of the computation. This account can be used to justify the central commitments of artificial intelligence and computational cognitive science: the thesis of computational sufficiency, which holds that the right kind of computational structure suffices for the possession of a mind, and the thesis of computational explanation, which holds that computation provides a general framework for the explanation of cognitive processes. The theses are consequences of the facts that (a) computation can specify general patterns of causal organization, and (b) mentality is an organizational invariant, rooted in such patterns. Along the way I answer various challenges to the computationalist position, such as those put forward by Searle. I close by advocating a kind of minimal computationalism, compatible with a very wide variety of empirical approaches to the mind. This allows computation to serve as a true foundation for cognitive science.David J. Chalmers1998-06-18Z2011-03-11T08:53:49Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/327This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3271998-06-18ZConfirmation and the Computational Paradigm (or: Why Do You Think They Call It Artifical Intelligence?)The idea that human cognitive capacities are explainable by computational modles is often conjoined with the idea that, while the states postulated by such models are in fact realized by brain states, there are no type- type correlations between the states postulated by computational models and brain states (a corollary of token physicalism). I argue that these ideas are not jointly tenable. I discuss the kinds of empirical evidence available to cognitive scientists for (dis)confirming computational models of cognition and argue that none of these kinds of evidence can be relevant to a choice among competing models unless there are in fact type-type correlations between the states postulated by computational models and brain states. Thus, I conclude, research into the computational procedures employed in human cognition must be conducted hand-in-hand with research into the brain processes which realize those procedures.David J. Buller2001-04-16Z2011-03-11T08:54:37Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1450This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/14502001-04-16ZA Conflation of Folk Psychologies: A Commentary on Stich's What is a Theory of Mental Representation?Stich begins his paper "What is a Theory of Mental Representation?" (1992) by noting that while
there is a dizzying range of theories of mental representation in today's philosophical market
place, there is very little self-conscious reflection about what a theory of mental representation is
supposed to do. This is quite remarkable, he thinks, because if we bother to engage in such
reflection, some very surprising conclusions begin to emerge. The most surprising conclusion of
all, according to Stich, is that most of the philosophers in this field are undertaking work that is
quite futile:
It is my contention that most of the players in this very crowded field have no coherent project
that could possibly be pursued successfully with the methods they are using. (p.244)
Stich readily admits that this is a startling conclusion; so startling, he thinks, that some may even
take it as an indication that he has simply "failed to figure out what those who are searching for
a theory of mental representation are up to" (p.244). But it is a conclusion that he is willing to
stand by, and he sets about it defending it in the body of his paper.
Stich, I think, is right about thisI do take his conclusion to indicate that he has failed to
figure out what those who are searching for a theory of mental representation are up to. And he
has failed to do this largely because he has failed to distinguish between the theory of mind that is
implicit in our folk psychology and the mental mechanism that is responsible for our capacity to
make folk psychological judgements. When this conflation is undone, so too is the reasoning that
takes Stich to his startling conclusion. This is not to say that the conclusion itself is clearly false; it
is merely to say that Stich has failed to show that it is true.
In what follows I will defend this analysis of Stich's self-conscious reflections on what a
theory of mental representation is supposed to do. I will begin with a very brief exposition of
Stich's survey of the logical terrain in this part of the philosophical landscape and the line of
reasoning that subsequently delivers up the aforementioned conclusion. I will then go on to
argue that the latter line of reasoning is fundamentally misdirected because of an error in the
former survey.Gerard OBrien2007-01-31Z2011-03-11T08:56:45Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5373This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/53732007-01-31ZConnecting Visual and Verbal Space: Preliminary Considerations Concerning the Concept 'Mental Image'AI research concerning the connection between seeing and speaking mainly employs what is called reference semantics. Within this framework, the notion of `mental image' is often used while explaining how somebody not situated in the same perceptual context is able to anchor his understanding of an utterance describing the scene visually perceived by the speaker. We give a foundation for considering mental images as propositions with respect to a certain field of concepts: these fields have to provide a syntactically dense set of concepts distinguishing locations. The use of such propositions in the reference semantic explanations of understanding utterances about visually perceived scenes is motivated by applying Kant's idea of the introduction of new types of objects: we conceive spatial relations as relations only applicable to sortal objects, i.e., individuated objects which are synthetically introduced on a syntactically dense field providing their potential locations. The concept `mental image' which results from these preliminary studies is applied to two current projects in AI, one dealing with the semantics of particular spatial prepositions, and the other more generally concerned with the logic of the connection between visual and verbal space.Dr. Joerg R.J. Schirra1998-02-12Z2011-03-11T08:54:06Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/595This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5951998-02-12ZConsciousness, Causality and ComplementarityAbstract of 1991 target article: Investigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing. Input analysis is thought to be initially "preconscious," "pre-attentive," fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by "conscious," "focal-attentive" analysis which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed to identify complex, novel stimuli. Conscious processing has also been thought to be necessary for choice, learning and memory, and the organization of complex, novel responses, particularly those requiring planning, reflection, or creativity. The present target article reviews evidence that consciousness performs none of these functions. Consciousness nearly always results from focal-attentive processing (as a form of output) but does not itself enter into this or any other form of human information processing. This suggests that the term "conscious process" needs re-examination. Consciousness appears to be necessary in a variety of tasks because they require focal-attentive processing; if consciousness is absent, focal-attentive processing is absent. From a first-person perspective, however, conscious states are causally effective. First-person accounts are complementary to third-person accounts. Although they can be translated into third-person accounts, they cannot be reduced to them.Max Velmans2001-11-11Z2011-03-11T08:54:49Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1864This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/18642001-11-11ZContextual normalization applied to aircraft gas turbine engine diagnosisDiagnosing faults in aircraft gas turbine engines is a complex problem. It involves several tasks,
including rapid and accurate interpretation of patterns in engine sensor data. We have investigated
contextual normalization for the development of a software tool to help engine repair technicians
with interpretation of sensor data. Contextual normalization is a new strategy for employing
machine learning. It handles variation in data that is due to contextual factors, rather than the
health of the engine. It does this by normalizing the data in a context-sensitive manner. This
learning strategy was developed and tested using 242 observations of an aircraft gas turbine
engine in a test cell, where each observation consists of roughly 12,000 numbers, gathered over a
12 second interval. There were eight classes of observations: seven deliberately implanted classes
of faults and a healthy class. We compared two approaches to implementing our learning strategy:
linear regression and instance-based learning. We have three main results. (1) For the given
problem, instance-based learning works better than linear regression. (2) For this problem,
contextual normalization works better than other common forms of normalization. (3) The
algorithms described here can be the basis for a useful software tool for assisting technicians with
the interpretation of sensor data.Peter TurneyMichael Halasz2001-06-14Z2011-03-11T08:54:40Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1558This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/15582001-06-14ZA Contribution to Reference Semantics of Spatial Prepositions: The Visualization Problem and its Solution in VITRAThe cognitive function of mental images with respect to the referential aspect of language is examined and used in the listener model ANTLIMA of the natural language system SOCCER. An operational realization of the reference relation used to recognize instances of spatial concepts in the results of a vision system and also to visualize locative expressions is presented and compared to A. Herskovits' analysis of the semantics of spatial prepositions.
Jörg R.J. Schirra2006-12-22Z2011-03-11T08:56:44Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5315This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/53152006-12-22ZCorrelation of severity of psychiatric patients' delusions with right hemispatial inattention (left-turning behavior)
Studies associate psychotic disorders with various forms of subtle inattention to the right hemispace (left-turning behavior). The authors examined the correlation between this dopamine-related sign and severity of delusions (presumably dopaminergic symptoms) in 20 psychotic patients. Delusions were significantly correlated with severity of left-turning bias, and this neurological sign accounted for 33% of the variance in severity of delusions.HS BrachaRL LivingstonJ ClothierBB LiningtonCN Karson1998-07-02Z2011-03-11T08:53:50Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/347This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3471998-07-02ZCould there be a science of Economics?Much scientific thinking and thinking about science involves assumptions that there is a deep and pervasive order to the world that it is the business of science to disclose. A paradigmatic statement of such a view can be found in a widely discussed paper by a prominent economist, Milton Friedman (a paper which will be discussed in more detail shortly): A fundamental hypothesis of science is that appearances are deceptive and that there is a way of looking at or interpreting or organizing the evidence that will reveal superficially disconnected and diverse phenomena to be manifestations of a more fundamental and relatively simple structure. (1953/1984, p.231) On the other hand, the person sometimes described as the father of modern science, Francis Bacon, wrote: The human understanding is of its own nature prone to suppose the existence of more order and regularity in the world than it finds. And though there be many things in nature which are singular and unmatched, yet it devises for them conjugates and relatives which do not exist. (1620/1960, p. 50).J. Dupre2011-08-30T04:22:41Z2011-08-30T04:22:41Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7588This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/75882011-08-30T04:22:41ZDennett, Consciousness, and the Sorrows of FunctionalismLittle is gained, and much lost, by casting an empirical theory of previous consciousness in a "functionalist" philosophical mold. Consciousness Explained is an instructive failure. It resurrects various behaviorist dogmas; it denies consciousness any distinct cognitive ontology; it obliquely adopts many long-standing research positions relating parallel and sequential processing to consciousness, yet denies the core assumption which produced this research; it takes parallel processing ("Multiple Drafts") to be incompatible with educated common-sense views of consciousness (the "Cartesian Theater"), while in fact parallel processing is compatible with some Cartesian Theater views. Contrary to Dennett, the Cartesian Theater does not necessarily imply that contents must fully "arrive" in consciousness at a single, specifiable instant; criticism of the Cartesian Theater based on this attribution is thus without force. And if consciousness is a distinct information-bearing medium, functionalist attempts to "explain" consciousness are inherently inadequate.Dr. Bruce B. Manganmangan@cogsci.berkeley.edu2001-06-26Z2011-03-11T08:54:44Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1650This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/16502001-06-26ZDiscussion (passim)Comments on consciousness.Stevan Harnad2006-09-25Z2011-03-11T08:56:37Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5183This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/51832006-09-25ZEscalation Bias: Does It Extend to Marketing?Escalation bias implies that managers favor reinvestments in projects that are doing poorly over those doing well. We tested this implication in a marketing context by conducting experiments on advertising and product-design decisions. Each situation was varied to reflect either a long-term or a short-term decision. Besides these four conditions, we conducted three replications. We found little evidence of escalation bias by 365 subjects in the seven experimental comparisons.J. Scott ArmstrongNicole CovielloBarbara Safranek1998-04-14Z2011-03-11T08:53:47Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/275This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2751998-04-14ZEvolution, Teleology, IntentionalityNo response that was not as long and intricate as the two commentaries combined could do justice to their details, so what follows will satisfy nobody, myself included. I will concentrate on one issue discussed by both commentators: the relationship between evolution and teleological (or intentional) explanation. My response, in its brevity, may have just one virtue: it will confirm some of the hunches (or should I say suspicions) that these and other writers have entertained about my views. For more closely argued defenses of my points, see Dennett 1990a,b,c; 1991a,b.Daniel Dennett2001-06-18Z2011-03-11T08:54:41Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1590This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/15902001-06-18ZExorcizing the Ghost of Mental ImageryTo summarize, if we speak only about the information available in an object or
a data structure -- and forget for now that we have mental lives at all,
concerning ourselves only with our performance capacities -- it seems clear
that array representations are merely another form of symbolic information.
Are they likely to be the only form of internal representation, or the main one,
that explains our visual and spatial capacities? I think not; I think tasks like
Shepard & Cooper's (1982) ``mental rotation'' may be better accounted for by
internal representations that do not turn transducer projections into numbers
at all, but preserve them in analog form, one that is physically invertible by an
analog transformation that is one-to-one with the transducer projection (to
some subsensory and subcognitive level of neural granularity). In other words,
I agree with Glasgow that it is a matter of preserving information in the internal
representation, but I am not persuaded that arrays are the form the preserved
information takes (see Camberlain & Barlow 1982; Jeannerod 1994).Stevan Harnad2001-11-11Z2011-03-11T08:54:49Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1863This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/18632001-11-11ZExploiting context when learning to classifyThis paper addresses the problem of classifying observations when
features are context-sensitive, specifically when the testing set involves a context
that is different from the training set. The paper begins with a precise definition of
the problem, then general strategies are presented for enhancing the performance
of classification algorithms on this type of problem. These strategies are tested on
two domains. The first domain is the diagnosis of gas turbine engines. The
problem is to diagnose a faulty engine in one context, such as warm weather,
when the fault has previously been seen only in another context, such as cold
weather. The second domain is speech recognition. The problem is to recognize
words spoken by a new speaker, not represented in the training set. For both
domains, exploiting context results in substantially more accurate classification.Peter Turney2004-10-28Z2011-03-11T08:55:17Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3007This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/30072004-10-28ZFinite state automata: Dynamic task environments in problem solving researchThis paper presents a new research paradigm for analysing human learning in dynamic task environments based on the theory of finite-state automata. Some of the advantages of the approach are outlined. (1) It is possible to design classes of formally well-described dynamic task environments instead of idiosyncratic microworlds that are difficult if not impossible to compare. (2) The approach suggests assumptions about the mental representation of a discrete dynamic system. (3) The finite-state automata formalism suggests systematic and appropriate diagnostic procedures. (4) Using finite-state automata to design dynamic task environments, one does not have to give up the "ecological validity" appeal of computer-simulated scenarios.
An experiment on the utility of an external memory support system with system complexity and type of memory support as independent variables is reported to illustrate the application of the formal framework. Systematically derived dependent variables reflect both system knowledge and control performance. The results suggest that the benefits due to the availability of the external aid vary as a function of the complexity of the task. Also, using reaction time measurements, priming phenomena have been found that point to the importance of sequentiality in the representation of discrete systems. It is concluded that the approach, although not entirely new in experimental psychology, awaits further exploration in research on human learning in dynamic task environments and promises to be a stimulating paradigm for both basic and applied research.Axel BuchnerJoachim Funke1998-06-09Z2011-03-11T08:53:57Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/449This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4491998-06-09ZFormal modeling for work systems designOne approach to applied AI is to automate business processes and remove people from the system. Another approach is to use AI methods to model how work actually gets done, so we can understand the essential role of knowledge people have about each other ("social knowledge") in allocating resources, assigning jobs, and forming teams.W J ClanceyB JordanP SachsD Torok1998-05-06Z2011-03-11T08:53:37Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/26This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/261998-05-06ZGenetic Analysis of Isolation-Induced Aggression. II. Postnatal Environmental Influences in AB MiceRecently, we reported on two closely-related inbred mouse strains, ABG and AB//Halle, that display extreme differences in isolation-induced intermale aggression. In the present article we investigated the influence of both maternal and social postnatal environmental influences. No effects were found of the postnatal maternal environment. Likewise, whether animals after weaning were housed together in same-strain or mixed-strain groups did not influence their subsequent aggressive behavior. We conclude that the aggressive behavior of ABG and AB//Halle is rather robust with regard to postnatal environmental modification and that the difference between the two strains is most likely due to only few genetic factors.Hans-Jurgen HoffmanRegine SchneiderWim E Crusio1998-05-06Z2011-03-11T08:53:37Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/27This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/271998-05-06ZGenetic Analysis of Isolation-induced Aggression. III. Classical Cross-breeding Analysis of Differences Between Two Closely-Related Inbred Mouse StrainsIn two preceding papers we reported on two closely-related inbred mouse strains, ABG and AB//Halle that display very large differences in isolation-induced intermale aggression. In the present article we investigated animals from a complete Mendelian cross between these strains to test the hypothesis that the behavioral difference is due to genetic variation at only few loci, possibly just one. In the quantitative-genetic analysis of generation means and variances for the behavioral variables analyzed, relatively simple models were found. As epistasis was present in some cases, the monogenic hypothesis could not be confirmed. Also, the analysis of the segregating generations by means of Collins' nonparametric method revealed significant deviations of observed from expected distributions. We conclude that differences at more than just one single locus are correlated with the behavioral difference.Horst SchicknickHans-Jurgen HoffmannRegine SchneiderWim E Crusio1999-06-14Z2011-03-11T08:54:02Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/542This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5421999-06-14ZGrounding Analog ComputersIn this commentary on Harnad's "Grounding Symbols in the Analog World with Neural Nets: A Hybrid Model," the issues of symbol grounding and analog (continuous) computation are separated, it is argued that symbol graounding is as important an issue for analog cognitive models as for digital (discrete) models. The similarities and differences between continuous and discrete computation are discussed, as well as the grounding of continuous representations. A continuous analog of the Chinese Room is presented.Bruce J. MacLennan2001-06-18Z2011-03-11T08:54:41Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1586This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/15862001-06-18ZGrounding Symbols in the Analog World with Neural NetsHarnad's main argument can be roughly summarised as follows: due to Searle's
Chinese Room argument, symbol systems by themselves are insufficient to
exhibit cognition, because the symbols are not grounded in the real world, hence
without meaning. However, a symbol system that is connected to the real world
through transducers receiving sensory data, with neural nets translating these
data into sensory categories, would not be subject to the Chinese Room
argument.
Harnad's article is not only the starting point for the present debate, but is also a
contribution to a longlasting discussion about such questions as: Can a computer
think? If yes, would this be solely by virtue of its program? Is the Turing Test
appropriate for deciding whether a computer thinks?Stevan Harnad1998-06-12Z2011-03-11T08:53:58Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/454This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4541998-06-12ZGuidon-Manage revisited: A socio-technical systems approach.Until the late 1980s, ITS research proceeded in a harmonious way, with almost universal agreement within the community about the nature of human knowledge and learning. With the rise of situated cognition theories, considerable confusion has developed about theories of intelligence, when and how formal subject matter theories should be taught, and the relation of instructional technology to human interactions. Now, after several years of forming a new interdisciplinary community, methods for developing instructional programs can be articulated that emphasize developing programs that fit in the classroom and workplace. These methods place previous design processes into sharp relief and help us understand situated cognition claims about the relation of theory and practice.William J. Clancey1998-10-20Z2011-03-11T08:54:16Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/752This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7521998-10-20ZIntentionality, mind and folk psychology.The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: one methodological and one structural. On the other hand, Goldman raises an important question when he is asking how people ascribe mental states to themselves. Reasons why Goldman's attempt to understand common sense mental representations by using an analogy from visual perception is problematic are discussed. The role which is attributed to a phenomenology is evaluated.W.H. DittrichS.E.G. Lea1999-10-21Z2011-03-11T08:53:41Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/121This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1211999-10-21ZInterval-specific event related potentials to omitted stimuli in the electrosensory pathway in elasmobranchs: an elementary form of expectationMultiunit activity and slow local field potentials show Omitted Stimulus Potentials (OSP) in the electrosensory system in rays after a missing stimulus in a 3 to >20 Hz train of microvolt pulses in the bath, at levels from the primary medullary nucleus to the telencephalon. A precursor can be seen in the afferent nerve. The OSP follows the due-time of the first omitted stimulus with a, usually, constant main peak latency, 30-50 ms in medullary dorsal nucleus, 60-100 ms in midbrain, 120-190 ms in telencephalon - as though the brain has an expectation specific to the interstimulus interval (ISI). The latency, form and components vary between nerve, medulla, midbrain and forebrain. They include early fast waves, later slow waves and labile induced rhythms. Responsive loci are quite local. Besides ISI, which exerts a strong influence, many factors affect the OSP slightly, including train parameters and intensity, duration and polarity of the single stimulus pulses. Jitter of ISI does not reduce the OSP substantially, if the last interval equals the mean; the mean and the last interval have the main effect on both amplitude and latency. Taken together with our recent findings on visually evoked OSPs, we conclude that OSPs do not require higher brain levels or even the complexities of the retina. They appear in primary sensory nuclei and are then modified at midbrain and telencephalic levels. We propose that the initial processes are partly in the receptors and partly in the first central relay including a rapid increase of some depressing influence contributed by each stimulus. This influence comes to an ISI-specific equilibrium with the excitatory influence; withholding a stimulus and hence its depressing influence causes a rebound excitation with a specific latency.T.H. BullockSacit KaramürselMichael H. Hofmann1998-12-13Z2011-03-11T08:54:17Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/773This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7731998-12-13ZIs humn mating adventitious or the result of lawful choice? A twin study of mate selection.Inventory data on a large sample of middle-aged twins and their spouses confirmed that spousal pairs are consistently but weakly similar on traits of personality, interests, talents, and attitudes. We argue, however, that neither the Similarity model of mate selection, nor one of its facets, the Equity model, can account for specific mate choice. We therefore tested the hypothesis that people select their mates using idiosyncratic criteria and that the spouses of monozygotic (MZ) twins should therefore be very similar. When compared to spouses of dizygotic (DZ) twins or even to random pairs of spouses, the spouses of MZ twins failed to show the predicted excess of small intra-spouse differences. We asked 547 of these twins to rate their attitudes toward their cotwin's choices of wardrobe, furnishings, vacations, jobs - and spouses; a similar questionnaire was completed by the spouses of these twins. Both data sets confirm that MZ twins are very similar in most of their choices, more so than DZ twins, but nearly 40% of both MZs and DZs recall that they actually disliked their cotwin's choice of mate at the time that choice was made. Similarly, 30% of the spouses of MZ twins report actually disliking the identical twin of the mate they had recently selected. Our findings suggest that characteristics both of the chooser and the chosen constrain mate selection only weakly. We propose that it is romantic infatuation that commonly determines the final choice from a broad field of potential eligibles and that this phenomenon is inherently random, in the same sense as is imprinting in precocial birds.D.T. LykkenA. Tellegen1998-06-11Z2011-03-11T08:53:48Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/312This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3121998-06-11ZThe knowledge level reinterpreted: Modeling socio-technical systemsKnowledge acquisition is a process of developing qualitative models of systems in the worldphysical, social, technologicaloften for the first time, not extracting facts and rules that are already written down and filed away in an expert's mind. Models of reasoning describe how people behavehow they interactively gather evidence by looking and asking questions, represent a situation by saying and writing things, and plan to act in some environment. But such models are inherently brittle mechanisms: Human reinterpretation of rules and procedures is metaphorical, based on pre-linguistic perceptual categorization and non-deliberated sensory-motor coordination. This view of people relative to computer models yields an alternative view of what tools can be and the tool design process. Knowledge engineers are called to participate with social scientists and workers in the co-design of the workplace and tools for enhancing worker creativity and response to unanticipated situations. The emphasis is on augmenting human capabilities as they interact with each other to construct new conceptualizationsfacilitating conversationsnot just automating routine behavior. Software development in the context of use maintains connection to non-technical, social factors such as ownership of ideas and authority to participate. The role of knowledge engineering is not merely "capturing knowledge" in a program delivered by technicians to users. Rather, we seek to develop tools that help people in a community, in their everyday practice of creating new understandings and capabilities, new forms of knowledge.William J. Clancey2002-10-18Z2011-03-11T08:55:04Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2541This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/25412002-10-18ZL'Ancrage des Symboles dans le Monde Analogique a l'aide de Reseaux Neuronaux: un Modele HybrideLe modele d'ancrage propose ici est simple a recapituler. Les projections sensorielles analogiques sont les intrants des reseaux neuronaux qui doivent apprendre a connecter certaines des projections avec certains symboles (le nom de leur categorie) et certaines autres projections avec d'autres symboles (les noms d'autres categories pouvant se confondre les unes aux autres), en trouvant et en utilisant les invariants qui les representent de facon a favoriser l'accomplissement d'une categorisation juste. Les symboles ancres sont alors enfiles dans des combinaisons d'ordre superieur (descriptions symboliques ancrees) par un deuxieme processus combinatoire qui presente une difference critique a l'egard de la manipulation symbolique classique. Dans la manipulation symbolique standard (non ancree), la syntaxe est la seule contrainte a laquelle les combinaisons de symboles sont soumises et elle s'applique a la configuration (arbitraire) des symboles. Dans un systeme symbolique ancre, on doit tenir compte d'une deuxieme contrainte, celle de la forme non arbitraire des invariants sensoriels qui connectent le symbole a la projection sensorielle analogique de l'objet auquel il se rapporte. Je ne peux m'etendre sur la nature de ces systemes symboliques ancres a double contrainte , si ce n'est que pour indiquer que la perception categorielle humaine peut apporter quelques indices quant a la nature de cette interaction entre les contraintes analogiques et syntaxiques.Stevan Harnad1998-04-14Z2011-03-11T08:53:43Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/190This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1901998-04-14ZLearning and LabelingClark and Karmiloff-Smith (CKS) have written an extraordinarily valuable paper, which sympathetically addresses what has all too often been an acrimonious and ideology-ridden "debate" and begins to transform it into a multi-perspective research program. By articulating the submerged hunches on both sides in a single framework, and adding some powerful new ideas of their own, they dispel much of the smoke of battle. What we can now see much more clearly is the need for a model of a brain/mind that, as they say, "enriches itself from within by re-representing the knowledge that it has already represented."Daniel C Dennett1998-04-14Z2011-03-11T08:53:47Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/270This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2701998-04-14ZLiving on the EdgeIn a survey of issues in philosophy of mind some years ago, I observed that "it is widely granted these days that dualism is not a serious view to contend with, but rather a cliff over which to push one's opponents." (Dennett, 1978, p.252) That was true enough, and I for one certainly didn't deplore the fact, but this rich array of essays tackling my book amply demonstrates that a cliff examined with care is better than a cliff ignored. And, as I have noted in my discussion of the blind spot and other gaps, you really can't perceive an edge unless you represent both sides of it. So one of the virtues of this gathering of essays is that it permits both friend and foe alike to take a good hard look at dualism, as represented by those who are tempted by it, those who can imagine no alternative to it, and those who, like me, still find it to be--in a word--hopeless.Daniel Dennett2000-10-16Z2011-03-11T08:54:25Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1024This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/10242000-10-16ZMark Twain Meets DSM-III-R: Conduct Disorder, Development, and the Concept of Harmful DysfunctionThe Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (3rd ed., rev.) (DSM-III-R) diagnosis of conduct disorder assumes that all children who engage in three or more criterion antisocial behaviors for 6 months or more suffer from a mental disorder. It resists all contextual information about a child's developmental history, capacities, strengths and circumstances, and assumes that the antisocial behavior necessarily stems from an underlying disorder. In this review, we use Mark Twain's narrative of the lives of Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry Finn as a point of departure for questioning the reasonableness of this assumption, and for examining normal as well as pathological pathways to antisocial behavior. We begin by reviewing the status of earlier controversies about the mental disorder concept in the service of documenting the impressive progress of the field in conceptualizing disorder. Next, we examine Wakefield's (1992a, 1992b) recently introduced 'harmful
dysfunction' concept of mental disorder and employ its criteria to evaluate the hypothesis that chronic
antisocial behavior in childhood as defined by DSM-III-R is caused by an underlying mental disorder. We also examine some of the difficulties in discriminating between disorder- and nondisorder-based antisocial behavior, and consider issues that warrant attention in future theoretical and empirical work. Finally, we explore the pragmatic rather than scientific basis for DSM-III-R's mental disorder claim and argue that regardless of its status as a mental dsorder, this most troubling and harmful behavior syndrome of childhood deserves the intensive interest, concern, and resources of the scientific and public health communities.John RichtersDante Cicchetti1998-04-14Z2011-03-11T08:53:47Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/272This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2721998-04-14ZThe Message is: There is no MediumSydney Shoemaker notes that my "avoidance of the standard philosophical terminology for discussing such matters" often creates problems for me; philosophers have a hard time figuring out what I am saying and what I am denying. My refusal to play ball with my colleagues is deliberate, of course, since I view the standard philosophical terminology as worse than useless--a major obstacle to progress since it consists of so many errors trapped in the seductively lucid amber of tradition: "obvious truths" that are simply false, broken-backed distinctions, and other cognitive illusions. I want to shift the perspective of philosophy of mind, and for that task using the standard terminology would be counterproductive. Fortunately, the inevitable communication-difficulties my policy provokes are forced into the open by occasions such as this constructive confrontation, permitting me to clarify my shocking message. I am grateful to Shoemaker, and to Michael Tye, Frank Jackson and David Rosenthal, for their vigorous and sympathetic reactions to my book.Daniel C Dennett2001-07-13Z2011-03-11T08:54:44Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1679This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/16792001-07-13ZMicroworlds based on linear equation systems: A new approach to complex problem solving and experimental resultsThe method of computer-simulated scenarios has recently been introduced to study how people solve complex problems. This paper describes a special approach to constructing such microworlds by means of linear structural equation systems. Subjects' task in the experimental situation is to first identify in a knowledge acquisition phase the causal structure of an hitherto unknown system. In a later knowledge application phase they have to control this system with respect to a given goal state. Knowledge that was acquired on the task is assessed both by means of causal diagrams - a method developed within this project and proven to be very useful - as well as by the degree of successful control performance. Three experiments on special attributes of such systems (active interventions versus observations only, effects of different degrees of Eigendynamik, the influence of different degrees of side effects) illustrate the approach. The menioned factors have considerable influence on identification and control of the system SINUS. The conclusion deals with the advantages of an experimental approach in this area.Joachim Funke1998-04-14Z2011-03-11T08:53:47Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/274This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2741998-04-14ZMultiple Drafts: An eternal golden braid?We have learned that the issues we raised are very difficult to think about clearly, and what "works" for one thinker falls flat for another, and leads yet another astray. So it is particularly useful to get these re-expressions of points we have tried to make. Both commentaries help by proposing further details for the Multiple Drafts Model, and asking good questions. They either directly clarify, or force us to clarify, our own account. They also both demonstrate how hard it is for even sympathetic commentators always to avoid the very habits of thought the Multiple Drafts Model was designed to combat. While acknowledging and expanding on their positive contributions, we must sound a few relatively minor alarms.Daniel C. DennettMarcel Kinsbourne1998-12-21Z2011-03-11T08:53:39Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/73This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/731998-12-21ZA Neural Attentional Model for Access to Consciousness: A Global Workspace PerspectiveA broad consensus has developed in recent years in the cognitive and neurosciences that the cognitive functions of the mind arise out of the activities of an extensive and diverse array of specialized processors operating as a parallel, distributed system. A theoretical perspective is presented which expands upon this "society" model to include globally integrative infuences upon this arrary of processors. This perspective serves as the basis for an explicit neural model of a "global workspace within a system of distributed specialized processors". Anatomical and physiological evidence are reviewed which suggest that this parallel, modular architecture is superceded by a more diffuse, tangential intracortical network capable of integrating underlying modular activites into increasingly global cognitive representations. There follows an explication of the role of this "neural global workspace" in providing the essential basis for the central control of attention and the generation of unified, conscious percepts. Finally the role of thalamic and brainstem activation systems in these integrative processes is discussed.James NewmanBernard J. Baars1998-05-05Z2011-03-11T08:53:48Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/292This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2921998-05-05ZNotes on "Epistemology of a Rule-based Expert System"In the 1970s, we conceived of a rule explanation as supplying the causal and social context that justifies a rule, an objective documentation for why a rule is correct. Today we would call such descriptions post-hoc design rationales, not proving the rules correctness, but providing a means for later interpreting why the rule was written and facilitating later improvements.William J. Clancey1998-05-05Z2011-03-11T08:53:48Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/293This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2931998-05-05ZNotes on "Heuristic Classification"Knowledge engineers once viewed themselves as priests; they received "The Word" from experts above, added nothing to the content, but codified it accurately into written rules, and passed it down to ordinary folks as commandments to live by.William J. Clancey1998-02-27Z2011-03-11T08:53:54Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/418This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4181998-02-27ZNotes on Formalizing ContextThese notes discuss formalizing contexts as first class objects. The basic relation is ist(c,p). It asserts that the proposition p is true in the context c. The most important formulas relate the propositions true in different contexts. Introducing contexts as formal objects will permit axiomatizations in limited contexts to be expanded to transcend the original limitations. This seems necessary to provide AI programs using logic with certain capabilities that human fact representation and human reasoning possess. Fully implementing transcendence seems to require further extensions to mathematical logic, i.e. beyond the nonmonotonic inference methods first invented in AI and now studied as a new domain of logic. Various notations are considered, but these notes are tentative in not proposing a single language with all the desired capabilities.John McCarthy2010-07-29T01:47:51Z2011-03-11T08:57:38Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6887This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/68872010-07-29T01:47:51ZThe optimal viewing position for children with normal and with poor reading abilities.This paper describes the optimal viewing position effect in normal young readers and children treated for dyslexia.M. Brysbaertmarc.brysbaert@ugent.beC. Meyers2001-06-18Z2011-03-11T08:54:41Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1589This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/15892001-06-18ZProblems, Problems: The Frame Problem as a Symptom of the Symbol Grounding ProblemThe frame-problem is a symptom of the symbol grounding problem.Stevan Harnad1998-02-17Z2011-03-11T08:54:06Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/600This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6001998-02-17ZThe Reality of Repressed MemoriesRepression is one of the most haunting concepts in psychology. Something shocking happens, and the mind pushes the experience into some inaccessible corner of the unconscious. Later, the memory may rise up and emerge into consciousness. Repression is one of the major foundation stones on which the structure of psychoanalysis rests. Recently there has been a rise in a particular type of repressed memory, namely reported claims of childhood sex abuse that were allegedly repressed for many years. With recent changes in legislation, people with recently-unearthed memories are suing alleged perpetrators for events that happened 20, 30, 40 or more years earlier. Juries and judges are now learing about repression. These new developments give rise to a number of questions 1) How common is it for memories of child abuse to be repressed? 2) How are juror and judges likely to react to these repressed memory claims? 3) When the memories surface, what are they like? and 4) How authentic are the memories?Elizabeth Loftus1998-02-24Z2011-03-11T08:53:46Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/241This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2411998-02-24ZReaping the WhirlwindHarnad's proposed "robotic upgrade" of Turing's Test (TT), from a test of linguistic capacity alone to a Total Turing Test (TTT) of linguistic and sensorimotor capacity, conflicts with his claim that no behavioral test provides even probable warrant for attributions of thought because there is "no evidence" [p.45] of consciousness besides "private experience" [p.52]. Intuitive, scientific, and philosophical considerations Harnad offers in favor of his proposed upgrade are unconvincing. I agree with Harnad that distinguishing real from "as if" thought on the basis of (presence or lack of) consciousness (thus rejecting Turing (behavioral) testing as sufficient warrant for mental attribution) has the skeptical consequence Harnad accepts -- "there is in fact no evidence for me that anyone else but me has a mind" [p.45]. I disagree with his acceptance of it! It would be better to give up the neo-Cartesian "faith" [p.52] in private conscious experience underlying Harnad's allegiance to Searle's controversial Chinese Room "Experiment" than give up all claim to know others think. It would be better to allow that (passing) Turing's Test evidences -- even strongly evidences -- thought.L Hauser1998-03-13Z2011-03-11T08:53:46Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/243This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2431998-03-13ZA Reflexive Science of ConsciousnessClassical ways of viewing the relation of consciousness to the brain and physical world make it difficult to see how consciousness can be a subject of scientific study. In contrast to physical events, it seems to be private, subjective, and viewable only from a subject's first-person perspective. But much of psychology does investigate human experience, which suggests that classical ways of viewing these relations must be wrong. An alternative, Reflexive model is outlined along with it's consequences for methodology. Within this model the external phenomenal world is viewed as part-of consciousness, rather than apart-from it. Observed events are only "public" in the sense of "private experience shared." Scientific observations are only "objective" in the sense of "intersubjective." Observed phenomena are only "repeatable" in the sense that they are sufficiently similar to be taken for "tokens" of the same event "type." This closes the gap between physical and psychological phenomena. Indeed, events out-there in the world can often be regarded as either physical or psychological depending on the network of relationships under consideration. Max Velmans1998-04-14Z2011-03-11T08:53:54Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/434This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4341998-04-14ZReview of Papert, The Children's MachineIn 1956, the mathematician John McCarthy coined the term "Artificial Intelligence" for a new discipline that was emerging from some of the more imaginative and playful explorations of the new mind-tool, the computer. A few years later he developed a radically new sort of programming language, Lisp, which became the lingua franca of AI. Unlike the sturdier, stodgier computer languages created by and for business and industry, Lisp was remarkably open-ended and freewheeling. Instead of concentrating on numbers, it was designed to take any symbols or symbol strings (lists) as its objects, and since its own machinery consisted of just such lists (and lists of lists . . . ), Lisp creations easily inhabited the very world they acted upon, and hence could reflect upon themselves and their own reflections indefinitely, revising and reinventing themselves, breaking down the artificial barrier between program and data. Seymour Papert was one of the most playful of the AI pioneers, and more than any of the others, his own reflections turned to the nature of that very playfulness and its role in learning and discovery. In 1980, he published Mindstorms, in which he presented his utopian vision of computers in the classroom, centering on Logo, a dialect of Lisp that he and others had developed specifically for very young children. The key design element was Turtle graphics, an inspired interface which made the children's interactions with Logo not just visible, but instantly comprehensible--feelable, you might say. The tales he told of those early encounters were compelling. They became an important ingredient in the barrage of persuasions that led teachers and schools all over America, and indeed all over the world, to invest huge sums in "computerizing the classroom." Thousands of teachers tried their hand at Logo in the classroom, with mixed results.Daniel C Dennett1998-04-14Z2011-03-11T08:53:47Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/277This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2771998-04-14ZReview of Searle, The Rediscovery of the MindEveryone agrees that consciousness is a very special phenomenon, unique in several ways, but there is scant agreement on just how special it is, and whether or not an explanation of it can be accommodated within normal science. John Searle's view, defended with passion in this book, is highly idiosyncratic: what is special about consciousness is its "subjective ontology," but normal science can accommodate subjective ontology alongside (not within) its otherwise objective ontology. Once we clear away some widespread confusions about what science requires, and dismiss the misbegotten field of cognitive science that has been engendered by those confusions, the subjective ontology of the mind, he claims, will lose its aura of unacceptable mystery.Daniel C Dennett1998-04-14Z2011-03-11T08:53:47Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/273This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2731998-04-14ZReview of Varela, E. Thompson and E. Rosch, (eds. )The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human ExperienceCognitive science, as an interdisciplinary school of thought, may have recently moved beyond the bandwagon stage onto the throne of orthodoxy, but it does not make a favorable first impression on many people. Familiar reactions on first encounters range from revulsion to condescending dismissal--very few faces in the crowd light up with the sense of "Aha! So that's how the mind works! Of course!" Cognitive science leaves something out, it seems; moreover, what it apparently leaves out is important, even precious. Boiled down to its essence, cognitive science proclaims that in one way or another our minds are computers, and this seems so mechanistic, reductionistic, intellectualistic, dry, philistine, unbiological. It leaves out emotion, or what philosophers call qualia, or value, or mattering, or . . . the soul. It doesn't explain what minds are so much as attempt to explain minds away.Daniel Dennett2001-11-11Z2011-03-11T08:54:48Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1861This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/18612001-11-11ZRobust classification with context-sensitive featuresThis paper addresses the problem of classifying observations when features are context-sensitive, especially when the testing set involves a context that is different from the training set. The paper begins with a precise definition of the problem, then general strategies are presented for enhancing the performance of classification algorithms on this type of problem. These strategies are tested on three domains. The first domain is the diagnosis of gas turbine engines. The problem is to diagnose a faulty engine in one context, such as warm weather, when the fault has previously been seen only in another context, such as cold weather. The second domain is speech recognition. The context is given by the identity of the speaker. The problem is to recognize words spoken by a new speaker, not represented in the training set. The third domain is medical prognosis. The problem is to predict whether a patient with hepatitis will live or die. The context is the age of the patient. For all three domains, exploiting context results in substantially more accurate classification.
Peter Turney1998-04-28Z2011-03-11T08:53:57Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/442This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4421998-04-28ZA self-organizing neural network that learns to detect and represent visual depth from occlusion eventsVisual occlusion events constitute a major source of depth information. We have developed a neural network model that learns to detect and represent depth relations, after a period of exposure to motion sequences containing occlusion and disocclusion events. The network's learning is governed by a new set of learning and activation rules. The network develops two parallel opponent channels or ``chains'' of lateral excitatory connections for every resolvable motion trajectory. One channel, the ``On'' chain or ``visible'' chain, is activated when a moving stimulus is visible. The other channel, the ``Off'' chain or ``invisible'' chain, is activated when a formerly visible stimulus becomes invisible due to occlusion. The On chain carries a predictive modal representation of the visible stimulus. The Off chain carries a persistent, amodal representation that predicts the motion of the invisible stimulus. The new learning rule uses disinhibitory signals emitted from the On chain to trigger learning in the Off chain. The Off chain neurons learn to interact reciprocally with other neurons that indicate the presence of occluders. The interactions let the network predict the disappearance and reappearance of stimuli moving behind occluders, and they let the unexpected disappearance or appearance of stimuli excite the representation of an inferred occluder at that location. Two results that have emerged from this research suggest how visual systems may learn to represent visual depth information. First, a visual system can learn a nonmetric representation of the depth relations arising from occlusion events. Second, parallel opponent On and Off channels that represent both modal and amodal stimuli can also be learned through the same proceJ. A. MarshallR. K. Alley2002-10-28Z2011-03-11T08:55:05Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2551This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/25512002-10-28ZSelf-talk and self-awareness: On the nature of the relation.This article raises the question of how we acquire self-information through self-talk, i.e., of how self-talk mediates self-awareness. It is first suggested that two
social mechanisms leading to self-awareness could be reproduced by self-talk: engaging in dialogues with ourselves, in which we talk to fictive persons, would permit
an internalization of others' perspectives; and addressing comments to ourselves about ourselves, as others do toward us, would allow an acquisition of self-information. Secondly, it is proposed that self-observation(self-awareness) is possible only if there exists a distance between the individual and any potentially
observable self-aspect; self-talk, because it conveys self-information under a different form (i.e., words), would create a redundancy -- and with it, a wedge -- within
the selfAlain Morin1998-06-16Z2011-03-11T08:53:58Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/459This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4591998-06-16ZSituated action: A neuropsychological interpretation (Response to Vera and Simon)Symbols in computer programs are not necessarily isomorphic in form or capability to neural processes. Representations in our models are stored descriptions of the world and human behavior, created by a human interpreter; representations in the brain are neither immutable forms nor encoded in some language. Although the term "symbol" can be usefully applied to describe words, smoke signals, neural maps, and graphic icons, a science of symbol processing requires distinguishing between the structural, developmental, and interactive nature of different forms of representing.William J. Clancey1998-06-09Z2011-03-11T08:53:48Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/303This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3031998-06-09ZA Situated Cognition Perspective on Learning on DemandRather than conceiving of learning on demand as finally memorizing someone elses theory, we might consider how people create and interpret their own representations in practice to model the work they are doing, weigh alternatives, and coordinate with others.William J. Clancey1998-06-07Z2011-03-11T08:54:11Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/676This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/6761998-06-07ZSocieties of minds: Science as Distributed ComputingScience is studied in very different ways by historians, philosophers, psychologists, and sociologists. Not only do researchers from different fields apply markedly different methods, they also tend to focus on apparently disparate aspects of science. At the farthest extremes, we find on one side some philosophers attempting logical analyses of scientific knowledge, and on the other some sociologists maintaining that all knowledge is socially constructed. This paper is an attempt to view history, philosophy, psychology, and sociology of science from a unified perspective.P. Thagard2011-08-30T04:22:46Z2011-08-30T04:22:46Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7587This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/75872011-08-30T04:22:46ZSome Philosophical and Empirical Implications of the Fringe
Some Philosophicalnext term and Empirical Implications of the FringeDr. Bruce B. Manganmangan@cogsci.berkeley.edu2001-03-31Z2011-03-11T08:54:37Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1424This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/14242001-03-31ZA Step in the Right DirectionA review of
W. Thomas Miller, III, Richard S. Sutton, and Paul J. Werbos (Eds.) Neural Networks for Control. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 1990. pp. 524.
This multi-disciplinary volume concerns the use of artificial neural networks in controlling dynamical processes. As used here 'dynamical' describes processes, such as certain chemical reaction systems, robots, or manufacturing plants, whose operation is governed by known or unknown non-linear models and which, therefore, are subject to certain types of problems related to unpredictability and chaotic performance. Artificial neural networks (ANN) are mathematical models whose components emulate the function of biological nervous systems.
Mary Ann Metzger2001-06-18Z2011-03-11T08:54:41Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1588This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/15882001-06-18ZSymbol Grounding is an Empirical Problem: Neural Nets are Just a Candidate Component"Symbol Grounding" is beginning to mean too many things to too many people. My own construal has always
been simple: Cognition cannot be just computation, because computation is just the systematically interpretable manipulation of
meaningless symbols, whereas the meanings of my thoughts don't depend on their interpretability or interpretation by someone
else. On pain of infinite regress, then, symbol meanings must be grounded in something other than just their interpretability if they
are to be candidates for what is going on in our heads. Neural nets may be one way to ground the names of concrete objects and
events in the capacity to categorize them (by learning the invariants in their sensorimotor projections). These grounded
elementary symbols could then be combined into symbol strings expressing propositions about more abstract categories.
Grounding does not equal meaning, however, and does not solve any philosophical problems. Stevan Harnad2011-08-30T04:22:58Z2011-08-30T04:22:58Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/7585This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/75852011-08-30T04:22:58ZTaking Phenomenology Seriously: The "Fringe" and Its Implications for Cognitive ResearchEvidence and theory ranging from traditional philosophy to contemporary cognitive research support the hypothesis that consciousness has a two-part structure: a focused region of articulated experience surrounded by a field of relatively unarticulated, vague experience.William James developed an especially useful phenomenological analysis of this "fringe" of consciousness, but its relation to, and potential value for, the study of cognition has not been explored. I propose strengthening James′ work on the fringe with a functional analysis: fringe experiences (1) work to radically condense context information in consciousness; (2) are vague because a more explicit representation of context information would overwhelm consciousness′ limited articulation (processing) capacity; (3) help mediate retrieval functions in consciousness; and (4) contain a subset of monitoring and control experiences that cannot be elaborated in focal attention and are "ineffable." In general, the phenomenology of the fringe is a consequence of its cognitive functions, constrained by consciousness′ limited articulation capacity. Crucial to monitoring and control is the feeling of "rightness." Rightness functions as a summary index of cognitive integration, representing, in the fringe, the degree of positive fit between a given conscious content and its parallel, unconsciously encoded context. Rightness appears analogous to the connectionist metric of global network integration, known variously as goodness-of-fit, harmony, or minimum energy.Dr. Bruce B. Manganmangan@cogsci.berkeley.edu2005-12-30Z2011-03-11T08:56:14Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4664This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/46642005-12-30ZA theory of general impairment of gene-expression manifesting as autismThis is the first part of a combined theory of autism and general intelligence (IQ). It is argued that general impairment of gene-expression, produced by a diversity of environmental and genetic causes, is in moderation advantageous in suppressing genetic idiosyncracies. But in excess it will produce a condition involving abnormalities of appearance and behaviour, with a particular relationship to high parental social class and IQ and with particular sex distributions. Character-istics and findings relating to schizophrenia, manic-depressive illness, or neuroses indicate that they cannot reasonably be considered manifestations of excessive general impairment of gene-expression. By contrast, characteristics and findings relating to autism accord very well with this conception. The suggestion is that autism involves primary abnormalities in diverse parts of the brain and in diverse psychological functions. Random binding to DNA may be a substantial mechanism of general impairment of gene-expression. [i.e., would definitely cause impairment, and hence cause autism, but only may be substantially involved (see para. 15)].R.P. Clarke2006-09-01Z2011-03-11T08:56:34Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5069This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/50692006-09-01ZA theory of general impairment of gene-expression manifesting as autismThis is the first part of a combined theory of autism and general intelligence (IQ). It is argued that general impairment of gene-expression, produced by a diversity of environmental and genetic causes, is in moderation advantageous in suppressing genetic idiosyncracies. But in excess it will produce a condition involving abnormalities of appearance and behaviour, with a particular relationship to high parental social class and IQ and with particular sex distributions. Character-istics and findings relating to schizophrenia, manic-depressive illness, or neuroses indicate that they cannot reasonably be considered manifestations of excessive general impairment of gene-expression. By contrast, characteristics and findings relating to autism accord very well with this conception. The suggestion is that autism involves primary abnormalities in diverse parts of the brain and in diverse psychological functions. Random binding to DNA may be a substantial mechanism of general impairment of gene-expression. [i.e., would definitely cause impairment, and hence cause autism, but only may be substantially involved (see para. 15)].R.P. Clarke2006-10-05Z2011-03-11T08:56:38Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/5207This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/52072006-10-05ZA theory of general impairment of gene-expression manifesting as autismThis is the first part of a combined theory of autism and general intelligence (IQ). It is argued that general impairment of gene-expression, produced by a diversity of environmental and genetic causes, is in moderation advantageous in suppressing genetic idiosyncracies. But in excess it will produce a condition involving abnormalities of appearance and behaviour, with a particular relationship to high parental social class and IQ and with particular sex distributions. Characteristics and findings relating to schizophrenia, manic-depressive illness, or neuroses indicate that they cannot reasonably be considered manifestations of excessive general impairment of gene-expression. By contrast, characteristics and findings relating to autism accord very well with this conception. The suggestion is that autism involves primary abnormalities in diverse parts of the brain and in diverse psychological functions. Random binding to DNA may be a substantial mechanism of general impairment of gene-expression. [i.e., would definitely cause impairment, and hence cause autism, but only may be substantially involved (see para. 15)].R.P. Clarke2004-05-06Z2011-03-11T08:55:33Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3620This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/36202004-05-06ZTraitement de texte et stratégies rédactionnellesThe objective of this experimental observation is to show how the use of a standard word processor changes the writing strategies devised by advanced users during the production of short texts. Empirical research has indicated that word processors, in fact, have a negative impact on writing strategies. Analysis of the conditions under which "man-machine" dialogue takes place, has shown that screen size and linear management both have an effect on writing. Before determining the ways in which a word processor can disrupt common writing practices, we must gain a better understanding of how a text is actually composed in real time, with or without a computer. Although the various writing processes have been clearly identified, the functional scenario describing the succession of writing phases and accompagnying activities is still poorly defined. The marks produced by writers on paper, whether linguistic (words, sentence fragments, sentences) or non-linguistic (arrows, underlining, indexation, diagrams, etc.), reflect the planning, translating, and revising processes being carried out by the writer. Sharples and Pemberton (1990) describe the exact functions of these marks in the elaboration of the ideas to be translated into text form (levels of organization). However, more knowledge about their frequency of use at the different stages of text composition is required. This is one of the goals of the present experimental observation. For the most part, such marks cannot be displayed and manipulated on the screen of a standard word processor as they can on paper. It is therefore crucial that we observe the means employed by writers to adapt their use of these necessary devices to word processing.
The main results indicate that writers who use a word processor still resort to "pencil and paper" for the initial planning. The small amount of text preparation done by computer users (manifested by chronological and hierarchical organization marks) compared to writers who produce without a word processor is compensated by extensive revision on the screen. However, while writing strategies are highly dependent on production conditions, the quality of the texts produced does not vary significantly. The possibility of eliminating one of the important drawbacks of computer-assisted writing i. e. the fact that the information must be displayed linearly on the screen, is currently being studied by designers of planning aids that accompagny word processors. Before such aids can actually be developed, however, more knowledge is needed of the phases of writing and the marks used by writers throughout the production process.A PiolatN IsnardV Della Valle2003-10-14Z2011-03-11T08:55:22Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3212This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/32122003-10-14ZThe unitary hypothesis: A common neural circuitry for novel manipulations, language, plan-ahead, and throwing?Plan-ahead becomes necessary for those movements which are over-and-done in less time than it takes for the feedback loop to operate. Natural selection for one of the ballistic movements (hammering, clubbing, and throwing) could evolve a plan-ahead serial buffer for hand-arm commands that would benefit the other ballistic movements as well. This same circuitry may also sequence other muscles (children learning handwriting often screw up their faces and tongues) and so novel oral-facial sequences may also benefit (as might kicking and dancing). An elaborated version of the sequencer may constitute a Darwin Machine that spins scenarios, evolves sentences, and facilitates insight by offline simulation. An example is given of an evolutionary scenario from an apelike ancestor, demonstrating the transition behaviors and growth curve considerations that any such theory needs to have; this particular scenario (involving throwing improvements) also suggests an explanation for the puzzling design of the Acheulean "handaxe."
Prof William H Calvin1998-04-28Z2011-03-11T08:53:57Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/441This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4411998-04-28ZUnsmearing visual motion: Development of long-range horizontal intrinsic connectionsHuman vision systems integrate information nonlocally, across long spatial ranges. For example, a moving stimulus appears smeared when viewed briefly (30 ms), yet sharp when viewed for a longer exposure (100 ms) (Burr, 1980). This suggests that visual systems combine information along a trajectory that matches the motion of the stimulus. Our self-organizing neural network model shows how developmental exposure to moving stimuli can direct the formation of horizontal trajectory-specific motion integration pathways that unsmear representations of moving stimuli. These results account for Burr's data and can potentially also model other phenomena, such as visual inertia.K.E. MartinJ.A. Marshall2005-06-30Z2011-03-11T08:56:06Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/4429This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/44292005-06-30ZUser-hostile systems and patterns of psychophysiological activityPsychophysiological measures, which are not contaminated by demand characteristics, are potentially useful for improving systems and for examining psychological processes in human-computer interaction. In this study we report the use of minute-by-minute scored heart-rate (HR) and skin-conductance level (SCL) in a 25-subject experiment. Each subject was presented with two simulated bank-transaction tasks, one user-friendly and the other user-hostile. To check whether any differences were due simply to sheer difficulty, easy (forward digit-span) and hard (backward digit-span) memory tasks were presented to all subjects. The HR was higher during the computer (problem-solving) tasks than the memory tasks, but was unaffected by task difficulty, whereas SCL was uniquely elevated during the hard (user-hostile) computer task. The HR result is interpreted as reflecting parasympathetic withdrawal, while the SCL result suggests that the user-hostile software produced sympathetic excitation of the sort associated with the fight-or-flight reaction. SCL may serve as a good measure of user-friendliness.Paul MuterJ.J. FuredyA. VincentT. Pelcowitz1998-02-24Z2011-03-11T08:53:46Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/242This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/2421998-02-24ZWhy Isn't My Pocket Calculator a Thinking ThingMy pocket calculator (Cal) has certain arithmetical abilities: it seems Cal calculates. That calculating is thinking seems equally untendentious. Yet these two claims together provide premises for a seemingly valid syllogism whose conclusion -- Cal thinks -- most would deny. I consider several ways to avoid this conclusion, and find them mostly wanting. Either we ourselves can't be said to think or calculate if our calculation-like performances are judged by the standards proposed to rule out Cal; or the standards -- e.g., autonomy and self-consciousness -- make it impossible to verify whether anything or anyone (save myself) meets them. While appeals to the intentionality of thought or the unity of minds provide more credible lines of resistance, available accounts of intentionality and mental unity are insufficiently clear and warranted to provide very substantial arguments against Cal's title to be called a thinking thing. Indeed, considerations favoring granting that title are more formidable than generally appreciated.L. Hauser