Autonomy in Anticipatory Systems: Significance for Functionality, Intentionality and MeaningJohnCollierauthorAbstract Many anticipatory systems cannot in
themselves act meaningfully or represent
intentionally. This stems largely from the derivative
nature of their functionality. All current artificial
control systems, and many living systems such as
organs and cellular parts of organisms derive any
intentionality they might have from their designers
or possessors. Derivative functionality requires
reference to some external autonomously functional
system, and derivative intentionality similarly
requires reference to an external autonomous
intentional system. The importance of autonomy
can be summed up in the following slogan: No
meaning without intention; no intention without
function; no function without autonomy. This paper
develops the role of autonomy to show how learning
new tasks is facilitated by autonomy, and further by
representational capacities that are functional for
autonomy.
Behavioral BiologyCognitive PsychologyPhilosophy of Mind1999Springer-VerlagConference Paper