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dc:title "HTML Summary of #937 \n\nCognitive Science and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Dilemma, and How to Avoid It\n\n";
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bibo:abstract "When it comes to applying computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, cognitive scientists appear to face a dilemma. The only\nstrategy that seems to be available is one that explains consciousness in terms of special kinds of computational processes. But such theories, while\nthey dominate the field, have counter-intuitive consequences; in particular, they force one to accept that phenomenal experience is composed of\ninformation processing effects. For cognitive scientists, therefore, it seems to come down to a choice between a counter-intuitive theory or no theory at\nall. We offer a way out of this dilemma. We argue that the computational theory of mind doesn't force cognitive scientists to explain consciousness in\nterms of computational processes, as there is an alternative strategy available: one that focuses on the representational vehicles that encode information\nin the brain. This alternative approach to consciousness allows us to do justice to the standard intuitions about phenomenal experience, yet remain\nwithin the confines of cognitive science. "^^xsd:string;
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dct:date "1997";
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skos:prefLabel "Cognitive Psychology" .
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skos:prefLabel "Philosophy of Mind" .
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