creators_name: Mallah, Jacques
creators_id: jackmallah@yahoo.com
type: confpaper
datestamp: 2014-02-25 12:52:11
lastmod: 2014-05-10 00:07:27
metadata_visibility: no_search
title: Structure and Dynamics in Implementation of Computations
ispublished: unpub
subjects: comp-sci-art-intel
subjects: comp-sci-mach-dynam-sys
subjects: phil-mind
subjects: phil-sci
full_text_status: public
keywords: structure, dynamics, implementation, computation, independence, inheritance, transference, counterfactual, structured states, neural replacement, partial brain
abstract: Without a proper restriction on mappings, virtually any
system could be seen as implementing any computation. That
would not allow characterization of systems in terms of
implemented computations and is not compatible with a
computationalist philosophy of mind. Information-based criteria for independence of substates within structured states are proposed as a solution. Objections to the use of requirements for transitions in counterfactual states are addressed, in part using the partial-brain argument as a general counterargument to neural replacement arguments.
date: 2014-02-23
date_type: submitted
publisher: AISB
refereed: TRUE
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citation:   Mallah, Dr. Jacques  (2014) Structure and Dynamics in Implementation of Computations.  [Conference Paper]    (Unpublished)  
document_url: http://cogprints.org/9207/1/Mallah-Structure-Dynamics-AISB14-fin3.pdf