---
abstract: "We all know about the vehicle/content distinction (see Dennett 1991a, Millikan 1991, 1993). We shouldn't confuse properties represented in content with properties of vehicles of content. In particular, we shouldn't confuse the personal and subpersonal levels. The contents of the mental states of subject/agents are at the personal level. Vehicles of content are causally explanatory subpersonal events or processes or states. We shouldn't suppose that the properties of vehicles must be projected into what they represent for subject/agents, or vice versa. This would be to confuse the personal and subpersonal levels."
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creators_name:
  - family: Hurley
    given: S L.
    honourific: ''
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date: 1998
date_type: published
datestamp: 1998-06-25
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eprintid: 710
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lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:54:13
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publication: Analysis
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rev_number: 8
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status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:33:20
subjects:
  - cog-psy
  - phil-mind
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title: 'Vehicles, Contents, Conceptual Structure, and Externalism'
type: journalp
userid: 71
volume: 58
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