creators_name: Hurley, S L.
type: journalp
datestamp: 1998-06-25
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:54:13
metadata_visibility: show
title: Vehicles, Contents, Conceptual Structure, and Externalism
ispublished: pub
subjects: cog-psy
subjects: phil-mind
full_text_status: public
abstract: We all know about the vehicle/content distinction (see Dennett 1991a, Millikan 1991, 1993). We shouldn't confuse properties represented in content with properties of vehicles of content. In particular, we shouldn't confuse the personal and subpersonal levels. The contents of the mental states of subject/agents are at the personal level. Vehicles of content are causally explanatory subpersonal events or processes or states. We shouldn't suppose that the properties of vehicles must be projected into what they represent for subject/agents, or vice versa. This would be to confuse the personal and subpersonal levels.
date: 1998
date_type: published
publication: Analysis
volume: 58
number: 1
pagerange: 1-6
refereed: TRUE
citation:   Hurley, S L.  (1998) Vehicles, Contents, Conceptual Structure, and Externalism.  [Journal (Paginated)]     
document_url: http://cogprints.org/710/1/Vccse.html