--- abstract: "In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument based on a third type of solution, by contrast to, on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and, on the other hand, the Eckhardt et al. analysis. I begin by strengthening both competing models by highlighting some variations of their original models, which renders them less vulnerable to several objections. I then describe a third line of solution, which incorporates insights from both Leslie and Eckhardt's models and fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to DA. I argue then that this two-sided analogy casts new light on the reference class problem. This leads finally to a novel formulation of the argument that could well be more plausible than the original one." altloc: [] chapter: ~ commentary: ~ commref: ~ confdates: ~ conference: ~ confloc: ~ contact_email: ~ creators_id: [] creators_name: - family: Franceschi given: Paul honourific: '' lineage: '' date: 2010-10-02 date_type: published datestamp: 2010-10-18 11:04:49 department: ~ dir: disk0/00/00/70/44 edit_lock_since: ~ edit_lock_until: 0 edit_lock_user: ~ editors_id: [] editors_name: [] eprint_status: archive eprintid: 7044 fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png;/7044/1/DA%2Den.pdf full_text_status: public importid: ~ institution: ~ isbn: ~ ispublished: pub issn: ~ item_issues_comment: [] item_issues_count: 0 item_issues_description: [] item_issues_id: [] item_issues_reported_by: [] item_issues_resolved_by: [] item_issues_status: [] item_issues_timestamp: [] item_issues_type: [] keywords: 'Doomsday argument, two-urn case, emerald case, thought experiment, probability theory' lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:57:45 latitude: ~ longitude: ~ metadata_visibility: show note: ~ number: ~ pagerange: ~ pubdom: FALSE publication: Journal of Philosophical Research publisher: ~ refereed: TRUE referencetext: "Bostrom, Nick. 1997. “Investigations into the Doomsday argument.” preprint at http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/inv/investigations.html.\r\n———. 2002. Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy New York: Routledge.\r\nChambers, Timothy. 2001. “Do Doomsday's Proponents Think We Were Born Yesterday?” Philosophy 76: 443-450.\r\nDelahaye, Jean-Paul. 1996. “Recherche de modèles pour l’argument de l’apocalypse de Carter-Leslie.” manuscrit.\r\nEckhardt, William. 1993. “Probability Theory and the Doomsday Argument.” Mind 102: 483-488.\r\n———. 1997. “A Shooting-Room view of Doomsday.” Journal of Philosophy 94: 244-259.\r\nFranceschi, Paul. 1998. “Une solution pour l'argument de l'Apocalypse.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28: 227-246.\r\n———. 1999. “Comment l'urne de Carter et Leslie se déverse dans celle de Hempel.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29: 139-156, English translation under the title “The Doomsday Argument and Hempel's Problem.” http://cogprints.org/2172/.\r\n———. 2002. “Une application des n-univers à l'argument de l'Apocalypse et au paradoxe de Goodman.” Corté: University of Corsica, doctoral dissertation.\r\nHájek, Alan. 2002. “Interpretations of Probability.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/probability-interpret.\r\nKorb, Kevin. & Oliver, Jonathan. 1998. “A Refutation of the Doomsday Argument.” Mind 107: 403-410.\r\nLeslie, John. 1993. “Doom and Probabilities.” Mind 102: 489-491.\r\n———. 1996. The End of the World: the science and ethics of human extinction London: Routledge.\r\nSober, Eliott. 2003. “An Empirical Critique of Two Versions of the Doomsday Argument - Gott’s Line and Leslie’s Wedge.” Synthese 135-3: 415-430.\r\nSowers, George. 2002. “The Demise of the Doomsday Argument.” Mind 111: 37-45." relation_type: [] relation_uri: [] reportno: ~ rev_number: 21 series: ~ source: ~ status_changed: 2010-10-18 11:04:49 subjects: - phil-logic - phil-epist succeeds: 4519 suggestions: ~ sword_depositor: ~ sword_slug: ~ thesistype: ~ title: A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument type: journale userid: 2943 volume: 34