creators_name: Franceschi, Paul
type: journale
datestamp: 2010-10-18 11:04:49
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:57:45
metadata_visibility: show
title: A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument
ispublished: pub
subjects: phil-logic
subjects: phil-epist
full_text_status: public
keywords: Doomsday argument, two-urn case, emerald case, thought experiment, probability theory
abstract: In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument based on a third type of solution, by contrast to, on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and, on the other hand, the Eckhardt et al. analysis. I begin by strengthening both competing models by highlighting some variations of their original models, which renders them less vulnerable to several objections. I then describe a third line of solution, which incorporates insights from both Leslie and Eckhardt's models and fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to DA. I argue then that this two-sided analogy casts new light on the reference class problem. This leads finally to a novel formulation of the argument that could well be more plausible than the original one.
date: 2010-10-02
date_type: published
publication: Journal of Philosophical Research
volume: 34
refereed: TRUE
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citation:   Franceschi, Paul  (2010) A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument.  [Journal (On-line/Unpaginated)]     
document_url: http://cogprints.org/7044/1/DA-en.pdf