@misc{cogprints6765,
          volume = {51},
          number = {4},
           month = {December},
          author = {Chuck  Stieg},
          editor = {Dr. Petr Bob and Miloslav Kukleka and Marek Susta},
           title = {Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure?},
       publisher = {Neuroscientia and NC Publishing},
            year = {2009},
         journal = {Activitas Nervosa Superior: the Journal for Neurocognitive Research},
           pages = {152--161},
        keywords = {Consciousness, Evolutionary Psychology, Function, Complexity},
             url = {http://cogprints.org/6765/},
        abstract = {Evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena have become widespread.  This paper examines a recent attempt by Nichols and Grantham (2000) to circumvent the problem of epiphenomenalism in establishing the selective status of consciousness.  Nichols and Grantham (2000) argue that a case can be made for the view that consciousness is an adaptation based on its complexity.  I set out this argument and argue that it fails to establish that phenomenal consciousness is a complex system.  It is suggested that the goal of establishing consciousness as an adaptation may be better served by rejecting the distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.}
}

<script src="//archive-bar.soton.ac.uk/archive-bar.js"></script>