creators_name: Franceschi, Paul
creators_id: p.franceschi@univ-corse.fr
type: preprint
datestamp: 2009-12-19 12:25:28
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:57:33
metadata_visibility: show
title: Theory of cognitive distortions: personalisation
subjects: cog-psy
full_text_status: public
keywords: cognitive therapy, cognitive distortions, personalisation, personalising bias, ideas of reference, delusion of reference
abstract: In a previous paper (Compléments pour une théorie des distorsions cognitives, Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive, 2007), we did present some elements aimed at contributing to a general theory of cognitive distortions. Based on the reference class, the duality and the system of taxa, these elements led to distinguish between the general cognitive distortions (dichotomous reasoning, disqualification of one pole, minimisation, maximisation) and the specific cognitive distortions (disqualifying the positive, selective abstraction, catastrophism). By also distinguishing between three levels of reasoning - the instantiation stage, the interpretation stage and the generalisation stage - we did also define two other cognitive distortions: over-generalisation and mislabelling (Théorie des distorsions cognitives : la sur-généralisation et l'étiquetage, Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive, 2009). We currently extend this model to another classical cognitive distortion: personalisation.
date: 2009-11-24
date_type: completed
refereed: FALSE
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citation:   Franceschi, Dr Paul  (2009) Theory of cognitive distortions: personalisation.  [Preprint]     
document_url: http://cogprints.org/6733/1/tbc-pers-en.pdf