@misc{cogprints662, editor = {T. Simon and R. Scholes}, title = {Neoconstructivism: A Unifying Constraint for the Cognitive Sciences}, author = {Stevan Harnad}, publisher = {Hillsdale NJ: Erlbaum}, year = {1982}, pages = {1--11}, journal = {Language, mind and brain}, keywords = {cognition, computation, computability, constructivism, theory}, url = {http://cogprints.org/662/}, abstract = {Behavioral scientists studied behavior; cognitive scientists study what generates behavior. Cognitive science is hence theoretical behaviorism (or behaviorism is experimental cognitivism). Behavior is data for a cognitive theorist. What counts as a theory of behavior? In this paper, a methodological constraint on theory construction -- "neoconstructivism" -- will be proposed (by analogy with constructivism in mathematics): Cognitive theory must be computable; given an encoding of the input to a behaving system, a theory must be able to compute (an encoding of) its outputs. It is a mistake to conclude, however, that this constraint requires cognitive theory to be computational, or that it follows from this that cognition is computation.} }