creators_name: Stieg, Chuck 
creators_id: stie0076@umn.edu
type: other
datestamp: 2008-08-24 10:56:57
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:57:10
metadata_visibility: show
title: Mental Representations: the New Sense-Data?
ispublished: unpub
subjects: phil-mind
subjects: phil-sci
subjects: phil-epist
subjects: phil-metaphys
subjects: cog-psy
full_text_status: public
keywords: Mental Representation, Sense Data
abstract: The notion of representation has become ubiquitous throughout cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience and the cognitive sciences generally. This paper addresses the status of mental representations as entities that have been posited to explain cognition.  I do so by examining similarities between mental representations and sense-data in both their characteristics and key arguments offered for each.  I hope to show that more caution in the adoption and use of representations in explaining cognition is warranted.  Moreover, by paying attention to problematic notions of representations, a less problematic sense of representation might emerge.  
date: 2004
date_type: completed
refereed: FALSE
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citation:   Stieg, Chuck   (2004) Mental Representations: the New Sense-Data?     (Unpublished)  
document_url: http://cogprints.org/6174/1/Mental_Reps_and_Sense_Data_Cog_P.doc
document_url: http://cogprints.org/6174/2/Mental_Reps_and_Sense_Data_Cog_P.pdf