creators_name: Stieg, Chuck 
creators_id: stie0076@umn.edu
type: other
datestamp: 2008-08-24 10:56:25
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:57:10
metadata_visibility: no_search
title: Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure?
ispublished: unpub
subjects: phil-mind
subjects: phil-epist
subjects: phil-sci
subjects: cog-psy
subjects: phil-metaphys
subjects: evol-psy
full_text_status: public
keywords: Consciousness, Evolutionary Psychology, Function, Complexity
abstract: Evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena have become widespread.  This paper examines a recent attempt by Nichols and Grantham (2000) to circumvent the problem of epiphenomenalism in establishing the selective status of consciousness.  Nichols and Grantham (2000) argue that a case can be made for the view that consciousness is an adaptation based on its complexity.  I set out this argument and argue that it fails to establish that phenomenal consciousness is a complex system.  It is suggested that the goal of establishing consciousness as an adaptation may be better served by rejecting the distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.
date: 2004
date_type: completed
refereed: FALSE
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citation:   Stieg, Chuck   (2004) Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure?     (Unpublished)  
document_url: http://cogprints.org/6173/1/PConsciousness%26ComplexitysubmitPhenom%26CogSci2.doc
document_url: http://cogprints.org/6173/2/PConsciousness%26ComplexitysubmitPhenom%26CogSci2.pdf