"6173","Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure?","Evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena have become widespread. This paper examines a recent attempt by Nichols and Grantham (2000) to circumvent the problem of epiphenomenalism in establishing the selective status of consciousness. Nichols and Grantham (2000) argue that a case can be made for the view that consciousness is an adaptation based on its complexity. I set out this argument and argue that it fails to establish that phenomenal consciousness is a complex system. It is suggested that the goal of establishing consciousness as an adaptation may be better served by rejecting the distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.","http://cogprints.org/6173/","Stieg, Chuck ","UNSPECIFIED"," Stieg, Chuck (2004) Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure? (Unpublished) ","stie0076@umn.edu","2004"