%A Chuck  Stieg
%T Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure?
%X Evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena have become widespread.  This paper examines a recent attempt by Nichols and Grantham (2000) to circumvent the problem of epiphenomenalism in establishing the selective status of consciousness.  Nichols and Grantham (2000) argue that a case can be made for the view that consciousness is an adaptation based on its complexity.  I set out this argument and argue that it fails to establish that phenomenal consciousness is a complex system.  It is suggested that the goal of establishing consciousness as an adaptation may be better served by rejecting the distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.
%D 2004
%K Consciousness, Evolutionary Psychology, Function, Complexity
%L cogprints6173

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