creators_name: Froese, Tom
creators_id: t.froese@gmail.com
editors_name: Lungarella, M
type: bookchapter
datestamp: 2007-10-22 10:41:58
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:56:59
metadata_visibility: show
title: On the Role of AI in the Ongoing Paradigm Shift within the Cognitive Sciences
ispublished: inpress
subjects: phil-mind
subjects: phil-sci
subjects: comp-sci-art-intel
full_text_status: public
keywords: AI, cognitive science, paradigm shift, enactivism, phenomenology
abstract: This paper supports the view that the ongoing shift from orthodox to embodied-embedded cognitive science has been significantly influenced by the experimental results generated by AI research. Recently, there has also been a noticeable shift toward enactivism, a paradigm which radicalizes the embodied-embedded approach by placing autonomous agency and lived subjectivity at the heart of cognitive science. Some first steps toward a clarification of the relationship of AI to this further shift are outlined. It is concluded that the success of enactivism in establishing itself as a mainstream cognitive science research program will depend less on progress made in AI research and more on the development of a phenomenological pragmatics.
date: 2007
date_type: published
publication: 50 Years of AI
publisher: Springer-Verlag
pagerange: 63-75
refereed: TRUE
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citation:   Froese, Mr Tom  (2007) On the Role of AI in the Ongoing Paradigm Shift within the Cognitive Sciences.  [Book Chapter]    (In Press)  
document_url: http://cogprints.org/5778/1/Froese2007.pdf