creators_name: Nagarjuna, G. creators_id: Nagarjuna G. editors_name: Ramadas, Jayashree editors_name: Chunawala, Sugra type: confpaper datestamp: 2006-05-30 lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:56:26 metadata_visibility: show title: Layers in the Fabric of Mind: A Critical Review of Cognitive Ontogeny ispublished: inpress subjects: dev-psy subjects: cog-psy subjects: phil-mind subjects: evol-psy subjects: phil-epist full_text_status: public keywords: modularity, Fodor, Chomsky, informational encapsulation, concept formation, conscious cognition, implicit knowledge, explicit knowledge, Karmiloff-Smith, Piaget abstract: The essay is critically examines the conceptual problems with the influential modularity model of mind. We shall see that one of the essential characters of modules, namely informational encapsulation, is not only inessential, it ties a knot at a crucial place blocking the solution to the problem of understanding the formation of concepts from percepts (nodes of procedural knowledge). Subsequently I propose that concept formation takes place by modulation of modules leading to cross-representations, which were otherwise prevented by encapsulation. It must be noted that the argument is not against modular architecture, but a variety of an architecture that prevents interaction among modules. This is followed by a brief argument demonstrating that module without modularization, i.e. without developmental history, is impossible. Finally the emerging picture of cognitive development is drawn in the form of the layers in the fabric of mind, with a brief statement of the possible implications. date: 2006 date_type: published publisher: Homi Bhabha Centre for Science Education, Mumbai, India refereed: TRUE referencetext: Anderson, J. R. (1983), ‘The Architecture of Cognition’. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Carey, S. and Gelman, R., editors (1991), ‘The Epigenesis of Mind: Essays on Biology and Cognition’. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, New Jersey. Carruthers, P. 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