--- abstract: 'Assume that a quale as we experience it is a perspective on an underlying physical state, rather than the physical state as such – the reality as known as distinct from the reality as such. Assume, further, that this inner perspective is integral to, and materially co-extensive with, the physical state itself. Assume, finally, that the physical state in question is known as a brain state of a particular kind by an external observer of the brain in which it occurs. The result is a perspective in which a quale is entirely physical; a position that resolves several known difficulties for physicalism, including those associated with the explanatory gap, Jackson’s knowledge argument, and Chalmers’ hard problem of consciousness.' altloc: [] chapter: ~ commentary: ~ commref: ~ confdates: ~ conference: ~ confloc: ~ contact_email: ~ creators_id: [] creators_name: - family: Nicholson given: Dennis honourific: Mr lineage: '' date: 2006-03 date_type: published datestamp: 2006-03-18 department: ~ dir: disk0/00/00/47/86 edit_lock_since: ~ edit_lock_until: ~ edit_lock_user: ~ editors_id: [] editors_name: [] eprint_status: archive eprintid: 4786 fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/text_html.png;/4786/1/HQCBPcoghtml.htm full_text_status: public importid: ~ institution: ~ isbn: ~ ispublished: ~ issn: ~ item_issues_comment: [] item_issues_count: 0 item_issues_description: [] item_issues_id: [] item_issues_reported_by: [] item_issues_resolved_by: [] item_issues_status: [] item_issues_timestamp: [] item_issues_type: [] keywords: 'qualia, mind-body problem, identity theory, hard problem, knowledge argument' lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:56:22 latitude: ~ longitude: ~ metadata_visibility: show note: ~ number: ~ pagerange: ~ pubdom: FALSE publication: ~ publisher: ~ refereed: FALSE referencetext: | Alter, T. 2006. The Knowledge Argument. Forthcoming in Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, eds. Schneider, S. And Velmans, M. Available at http://www.as.ua.edu/philos/talter/The Knowledge Argument.pdf Borst, C.V. 1970. The Mind-Brain IdentityTheory. London: MacMillan. Chalmers, D. J. 1995. Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3):200-219 Chalmers, D. J. 1996. The Conscious Mind. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chalmers, D.J. 2003. Consciousness and its Place in Nature. In Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, eds. Stich, S and Warfield, F. Oxford: Blackwell Deutsch, M. 1999. Subjective Physical Facts. Paper given at conference on The Conscious Mind, University of Buffalo, 1999. Available at http://www.neologic.net/rd/chalmers/mdeutsch.html. Himma, K.E. 2005. What is a Problem for All is a Problem for None: Substance Dualism, Physicalism, and the Mind-Body Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly. 42(2):81-92. Horowitz, A. and Jacobson-Horowitz, H. 2005. The Knowledge argument And Higher-Order Properties. Ratio. XVIII:48-64. Jackson, F. 1982. Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly. 32:127-36. Jackson, F. 1986. What Mary Didn't Know. The Journal of Philosophy. 83:291-95. Jackson, F. 2003. Mind and Illusion. In Minds and Persons, ed. O’Hear, A. 251-271.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McGinn, C. 1989. Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem, Mind, 98, 891:349-366. Papineau, D. 1993. Physicalism, Consciousness, and the Antipathetic Fallacy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 71(2):169-182. Shoemeaker, S. 1999. (and following papers) On David Chalmers’s The Conscious Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. LIX(2):439-472. Strawson, G. 1994. Mental Reality. Cambridge, Mass: the MIT Press, Bradford Books. Tye, M. 1999. Phenomenal Consciousness: The Explanatory Gap As A Cognitive Illusion. Mind. 108, 432: 705-725. relation_type: [] relation_uri: [] reportno: ~ rev_number: 8 series: ~ source: ~ status_changed: 2007-09-12 17:02:31 subjects: - phil-mind succeeds: ~ suggestions: ~ sword_depositor: ~ sword_slug: ~ thesistype: ~ title: How qualia can be physical type: preprint userid: 1479 volume: ~