--- abstract: "From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to (phenomenal) consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic ‘phenomenon’ in the Husserlian sense. Consequently, I replace Velmans’s reflexive model with a complementaristic approach in a strict sense which leaves no room for either monistic or dualistic views (including Velmans’s ontological monism and his dual-aspect interpretation of complementarity) and hence requires us to radically reinterpret the concept of psychophysical causation.\n" altloc: [] chapter: ~ commentary: ~ commref: ~ confdates: ~ conference: ~ confloc: ~ contact_email: ~ creators_id: [] creators_name: - family: Hoche given: Hans-Ulrich honourific: Prof. em. Dr. lineage: '' date: 2006 date_type: published datestamp: 2006-03-06 department: ~ dir: disk0/00/00/47/48 edit_lock_since: ~ edit_lock_until: ~ edit_lock_user: ~ editors_id: [] editors_name: - family: Gallagher given: Shaun honourific: Prof. Dr. lineage: '' eprint_status: archive eprintid: 4748 fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png;/4748/1/Microsoft_Word_%2D_PHEN_324Hoche.final.corr.pdf full_text_status: public importid: ~ institution: ~ isbn: ~ ispublished: inpress issn: ~ item_issues_comment: [] item_issues_count: 0 item_issues_description: [] item_issues_id: [] item_issues_reported_by: [] item_issues_resolved_by: [] item_issues_status: [] item_issues_timestamp: [] item_issues_type: [] keywords: "Consciousness, mind-body problem, complementarity, dual-aspect theory, phenomenology, psychophysical causation, pure noematics, reflexive monism, Velmans.\n" lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:56:20 latitude: ~ longitude: ~ metadata_visibility: show note: ~ number: ~ pagerange: ~ pubdom: FALSE publication: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences publisher: Springer refereed: TRUE referencetext: | Bohr, N. 1927. Das Quantenpostulat und die neuere Entwicklung der Atomistik [The quantum postulate and the recent development of atomistics; Bohr’s lecture delivered at the Como congress on September 16, 1927]. Reprinted in: W. Heisenberg / N. Bohr, Die Kopenhagener Deutung der Quantentheorie (3661). Stuttgart: Battenberg, 1963. Chalmers, D. J. 1996. The Conscious Mind. In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press. Drieschner, M. 1974. Objekte der Naturwissenschaft [Objects of natural science]. In: Tendenzen der Wissenschaftstheorie (Neue Hefte für Philosophie, No. 6/7): 104128. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Drieschner, M. 1981. Einführung in die Naturphilosophie [Introduction to the philosophy of nature]. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Drieschner, M. 1984. Physik a priori? [Physics (as a science) a priori?]. In: B. Kanitscheider (ed.), Moderne Naturphilosophie (4161). Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann. Edwards, P. (ed.) 1967. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 18. New York & London: Macmillan. (Reprint edition 1972.) Frege, G. 1884/1950. Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Eine logisch-mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl / The Foundations of Arithmetic. A logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number. English translation by J. L. Austin. Oxford: Blackwell, repr. 1974. Held, C. 1994. The meaning of complementarity. Studies in the History of the Philosophy of Science 25: 871893. Hoche, H. U. 1973a. Handlung, Bewusstsein und Leib. Vorstudien zu einer rein noematischen Phänomenologie [Action, consciousness, and (the functioning) body. Preliminary studies concerning a purely noematic phenomenology]. Freiburg & Munich: Alber. Hoche, H. U. 1973b. Review of Prauss 1971. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 55: 96100. Hoche, H. U. 1975/1983. Über die Rolle von Substanzbegriffen beim Zeigen und Zählen von Gegenständen. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 29 (1975): 337348. English translation (by Gerhard Heyer): How substance-concepts function in indicating and counting objects. In: Darrel E. Christensen et al. (eds.), Contemporary German Philosophy, Vol 2 (200211). University Park & London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983. Hoche, H. U. 1986. Subjektivität [Subjectivity]. In: Julie Kirchberg and Johannes Müther (eds), Philosophisch-Theologische Grenzfragen (5163). Essen: Ludgerus. Hoche, H. U. 1987. Das Leib-Seele-Problem: Dualismus, Monismus, Perspektivismus [The mind-body-problem: dualism, monism, perspectivism]. Philosophia Naturalis 24: 218236. Hoche, H. U. 1990. Einführung in das sprachanalytische Philosophieren [Introduction to Doing Philosophy in a Linguistic Key]. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Hoche, H. U. 1995a. Anthropologische Komplementarität und die ‘Einheit der Sache’. Versuch einer skeptischen Lösung eines skeptischen Zweifels [Anthropological complementarity and the ‘unity of man’. An attempt at a sceptical solution of a sceptical problem]. In: L. Kreimendahl et al. (eds.), Aufklärung und Skepsis. Studien zur Philosophie und Geistesgeschichte des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts (107129). Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog. Hoche, H. U. 1995b. Was kann die logische Analyse von Identitätsaussagen zur Lösung des Leib-Seele-Problems beitragen? [How to contribute to solving the mind-body problem by logically analysing identity-statements]. Circulated manuscript (lecture, delivered at the University of Freiburg, Germany, on June 13, 1995). Hoche, H. U. 1995c. Verteilte Repräsentation, neurophysiologische Selbstversuche und Komplementarität [Distributed representation, neurophysiological self-experiments, and complementarity]. Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften 6 (1): 9396. Hoche, H. U. and Strube, W. 1985. Analytische Philosophie [Analytic philosophy]. Freiburg & Munich: Alber (Handbuch Philosophie, Vol. 6). Holton, G. 1981. Zur Genesis des Komplementaritätsgedankens [On the genesis of the conception of complementarity]. In: G. Holton, Thematische Analyse der Wissenschaft. Die Physik Einsteins und seiner Zeit, translated into German by H. Huber (144202). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Hume, D. 1748. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, London. New edition by L. A. Selby-Bigge: Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, Oxford: Clarendon, 1888, 3rd ed. 1975. Husserl, E. 1913. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie [Ideas concerning a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy]. First Volume, ed. by W. Biemel (Husserliana, Vol. III). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950. Husserl, E. 1931. Ideas. General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Translated [from Husserl 1913] by W. R. Boyce Gibson. New York: Collier Books. Husserl, E. 19341937. Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie [The crisis of European science, and transcendental phenomenology]. Ed. by W. Biemel (Husserliana, Vol. VI). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954. Kripke, S. A. 1982. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. An Elementary Exposition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Popper, K. R. 1972. Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Clarendon. Prauss, G. 1971. Erscheinung bei Kant. Ein Problem der ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’ [Kant on appearance(s). A problem of the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’]. Berlin: de Gruyter. Ryle, G. 1949. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson. Searle, J. R. 1992. The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge (Mass.) & London: MIT Press. Velmans, M. 1990. Consciousness, brain and the physical world. Philosophical Psychology 3: 7799. Velmans, M. 2000. Understanding Consciousness. London & Philadelphia: Routledge. Velmans, M. 2002. How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9: 329. relation_type: [] relation_uri: [] reportno: ~ rev_number: 12 series: ~ source: ~ status_changed: 2007-09-12 17:02:12 subjects: - phil-mind succeeds: ~ suggestions: ~ sword_depositor: ~ sword_slug: ~ thesistype: ~ title: "'Reflexive Monism' versus 'Complementarism': An analysis and criticism of the conceptual groundwork of Max Velmans's 'reflexive model' of consciousness" type: journalp userid: 6211 volume: 2006