title: 'Reflexive Monism' versus 'Complementarism': An analysis and criticism of the conceptual groundwork of Max Velmans's 'reflexive model' of consciousness creator: Hoche, Prof. em. Dr. Hans-Ulrich subject: Philosophy of Mind description: From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to (phenomenal) consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic ‘phenomenon’ in the Husserlian sense. Consequently, I replace Velmans’s reflexive model with a complementaristic approach in a strict sense which leaves no room for either monistic or dualistic views (including Velmans’s ontological monism and his dual-aspect interpretation of complementarity) and hence requires us to radically reinterpret the concept of psychophysical causation. publisher: Springer contributor: Gallagher, Prof. Dr. Shaun date: 2006 type: Journal (Paginated) type: PeerReviewed format: application/pdf identifier: http://cogprints.org/4748/1/Microsoft_Word_-_PHEN_324Hoche.final.corr.pdf identifier: Hoche, Prof. em. Dr. Hans-Ulrich (2006) 'Reflexive Monism' versus 'Complementarism': An analysis and criticism of the conceptual groundwork of Max Velmans's 'reflexive model' of consciousness. [Journal (Paginated)] (In Press) relation: http://cogprints.org/4748/