creators_name: Thomas, Laurence
type: preprint
datestamp: 2005-09-18
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:56:11
metadata_visibility: show
title: Morality and a Meaningful Life
subjects: phil-ethics
full_text_status: public
keywords: P. F. Strawon, Wittgenstein, affirmation. meaningful life
abstract: This essay aims to capture the intuition that the moral person is, in virtue of being such, favored over the immoral person to lead a meaningful life.  It is argued that the reason for this is that the moral person is open to affirmation from others in a way that the immoral person is not.  Central to the argument is that idea of psychological health.  Being affirmed by others is a fundamental aspect of being psychologically health.  Thus, being moral and being psychologically healthy are said to dovetail with respect to leading a meaningful life.  The argument regarding psychological health draws upon, and extends, P. F. Strawson’s seminal essay “Freedom and Resentment”.  Also in this regard, Wittgenstein’s argument against the possibility of a private language is extended to social behavior generally.  
date: 2005-09
date_type: published
refereed: TRUE
referencetext: “The Meanings of Life,” in David Schmidtz (ed.), Robert Nozick (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002)
Thaddeus Metz in “The Concept of a Meaningful Life,” American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2001)
P. F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment,” Proceedings of the British Academy 48 (1962).
Neera K. Badhwar (ed), Friendship: A Philosophical Reader (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993)
Jean-Christophe Merle and Bernard N. Schumacher (eds), L’amitié (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2005)
Bernard Boxill, “How Injustice Pays,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 9 (1980)
Philippa Foot, “Moral Belief,” Virtues and Vices (New York: Oxford University California Press, 2002)
citation:   Thomas, Laurence  (2005) Morality and a Meaningful Life.  [Preprint]     
document_url: http://cogprints.org/4541/1/MeaningfulLife.pdf