creators_name: Franceschi, Paul type: preprint datestamp: 2005-08-24 lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:56:09 metadata_visibility: no_search title: A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument subjects: phil-logic subjects: phil-epist full_text_status: public keywords: Doomsday argument, two-urn case, emerald case, thought experiement, probability theory abstract: In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument based on a third type of solution, by contrast to on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and on the other hand, the Eckhardt et al. analysis. I begin by strengthening both competing models by highlighting some variations of their ancestors models, which renders them less vulnerable to several objections. I describe then a third line of solution, which incorporates insights from both Leslie and Eckhardt's models and fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to DA. I argue then that this two-sided analogy casts new light on the reference class problem. This leads finally to a novel formulation of the argument that could well be more consensual than the original one. date: 2005-08 date_type: published refereed: FALSE referencetext: Bostrom, N. (1997) ‘Investigations into the Doomsday argument’, preprint at http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/inv/investigations.html Bostrom, N. (2002) Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy, New York, Routledge Chambers, T. (2001) ‘Do Doomsday's Proponents Think We Were Born Yesterday?’, Philosophy, 76, 443-50 Delahaye, J-P. (1996) ‘Recherche de modèles pour l’argument de l’apocalypse de Carter-Leslie’, unpublished manuscript Eckhardt, W. (1993) ‘Probability Theory and the Doomsday Argument’, Mind, 102, 483-88 Eckhardt, W. (1997) ‘A Shooting-Room view of Doomsday’, Journal of Philosophy, 94, 244-259 Franceschi, P. (1998) ‘Une solution pour l'argument de l'apocalypse’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 28, 227-46 Franceschi, P. (1999) ‘Comment l'urne de Carter et Leslie se déverse dans celle de Hempel’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 29, 139-56, English translation under the title ‘The Doomsday Argument and Hempel's Problem’, PhilSci: 601 Franceschi, P. (2002) Une application des n-univers à l'argument de l'Apocalypse et au paradoxe de Goodman, Corté: University of Corsica, doctoral dissertation, published at Manuscrit-Université, Paris, 2004 Hájek, A. (2002) ‘Interpretations of Probability’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/probability-interpret Korb, K. & Oliver, J. (1998) ‘A Refutation of the Doomsday Argument’, Mind, 107, 403-10 Leslie, J. (1992) ‘Time and the Anthropic Principle’, Mind, 101, 521-40 Leslie, J. (1993) ‘Doom and Probabilities’, Mind, 102, 489-91 Leslie, J. (1996) The End of the World: the science and ethics of human extinction, London, Routledge Sober, E. (2003) ‘An Empirical Critique of Two Versions of the Doomsday Argument - Gott’s Line and Leslie’s Wedge’, Synthese, 135-3, 415-30 Sowers, G. F. (2002) ‘The Demise of the Doomsday Argument’, Mind, 111, 37-45 citation: Franceschi, Paul (2005) A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument. [Preprint] document_url: http://cogprints.org/4519/1/doomsday-en.pdf