--- abstract: 'The aim of the paper is to sketch a principle of individuation that is intended to serve the Fregean notion of a proposition, a notion I take for granted. A salient feature of Fregean propositions, i.e. complexes of modes of presentation of objects (individuals, properties), is that they are fine-grained items, so fine-grained that even synonymous sentences might express different Fregean propositions. My starting point is the principle labelled by Gareth Evans the Intuitive Criterion of Difference for Thoughts, which states that it is impossible coherently to take different mental attitudes to the same proposition. As a logical truth (a consequence of Leibniz’s Law), this is a synchronic principle, the application of which is restricted to attitudes held at a single time. I argue that such a restriction might be reasonably lifted and, on the basis of an adequate notion of attitude-retention, I propose an admissible diachronic extension of the principle.' altloc: - http://www.terravista.pt/Ancora/2558/boston.html chapter: ~ commentary: ~ commref: ~ confdates: '10-16 August, 1998' conference: 'Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Vol 6: Analyic Philosophy and Logic' confloc: Boston contact_email: ~ creators_id: [] creators_name: - family: Branquinho given: Joćo honourific: '' lineage: '' date: 2000 date_type: published datestamp: 2000-04-05 department: ~ dir: disk0/00/00/04/05 edit_lock_since: ~ edit_lock_until: ~ edit_lock_user: ~ editors_id: [] editors_name: - family: Kanamori given: Akihiro honourific: '' lineage: '' eprint_status: archive eprintid: 405 fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/text_html.png;/405/1/Boston.htm full_text_status: public importid: ~ institution: ~ isbn: ~ ispublished: pub issn: ~ item_issues_comment: [] item_issues_count: 0 item_issues_description: [] item_issues_id: [] item_issues_reported_by: [] item_issues_resolved_by: [] item_issues_status: [] item_issues_timestamp: [] item_issues_type: [] keywords: 'proposition, thought, propositional attitudes, mental state, rationality, belief, cognitive dynamics, propositionalmemory, mental content, diachronic identity, mental tokensand types' lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:53:53 latitude: ~ longitude: ~ metadata_visibility: show note: ~ number: ~ pagerange: 1-11 pubdom: FALSE publication: ~ publisher: 'Philosophy Documentation Centre, Bowling Green, Ohio' refereed: FALSE referencetext: ~ relation_type: [] relation_uri: [] reportno: ~ rev_number: 8 series: ~ source: ~ status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:27:23 subjects: - phil-lang - phil-mind succeeds: ~ suggestions: ~ sword_depositor: ~ sword_slug: ~ thesistype: ~ title: On the Individuation of Fregean Propositions type: confpaper userid: 314 volume: ~