TY - GEN ID - cogprints405 UR - http://cogprints.org/405/ A1 - Branquinho, Joćo Y1 - 2000/// N2 - The aim of the paper is to sketch a principle of individuation that is intended to serve the Fregean notion of a proposition, a notion I take for granted. A salient feature of Fregean propositions, i.e. complexes of modes of presentation of objects (individuals, properties), is that they are fine-grained items, so fine-grained that even synonymous sentences might express different Fregean propositions. My starting point is the principle labelled by Gareth Evans the Intuitive Criterion of Difference for Thoughts, which states that it is impossible coherently to take different mental attitudes to the same proposition. As a logical truth (a consequence of Leibniz’s Law), this is a synchronic principle, the application of which is restricted to attitudes held at a single time. I argue that such a restriction might be reasonably lifted and, on the basis of an adequate notion of attitude-retention, I propose an admissible diachronic extension of the principle. PB - Philosophy Documentation Centre, Bowling Green, Ohio KW - proposition KW - thought KW - propositional attitudes KW - mental state KW - rationality KW - belief KW - cognitive dynamics KW - propositionalmemory KW - mental content KW - diachronic identity KW - mental tokensand types TI - On the Individuation of Fregean Propositions SP - 1 AV - public EP - 11 ER -