%A Mr D.M. Nicholson
%T From a Flaw in the Knowledge Argument to a Physicalist Account of Qualia
%X The Knowledge argument based on the grey Mary thought experiment cannot be claimed as a basis for rejecting physicalism. First, because it is flawed, being so formulated as to predetermine the outcome of the thought experiment in favour of a refutation of physicalism. Second, because, once this is recognised, it becomes clear that there is one - and only one - account of the qualia-physical relationship that will permit physicalism to survive the thought experiment itself. It is suggested that the position in question is worthy of further consideration as a reasonable candidate theory for a physicalist account of qualia.
%D 2005
%K Knowledge argument, physicalism, qualia, mind-body problem, Identity theory, hard problem of consciousness, Kripke, Leibniz?s law
%L cogprints4020

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