title: From a Flaw in the Knowledge Argument to a Physicalist Account of Qualia
creator: Nicholson, Mr D.M.
subject: Philosophy of Mind
description: The Knowledge argument based on the grey Mary thought experiment cannot be claimed as a basis for rejecting physicalism. First, because it is flawed, being so formulated as to predetermine the outcome of the thought experiment in favour of a refutation of physicalism. Second, because, once this is recognised, it becomes clear that there is one - and only one - account of the qualia-physical relationship that will permit physicalism to survive the thought experiment itself. It is suggested that the position in question is worthy of further consideration as a reasonable candidate theory for a physicalist account of qualia.
date: 2005-01
type: Preprint
type: NonPeerReviewed
format: text/html
identifier: http://cogprints.org/4020/1/KAMBPFPweb.htm
identifier:   Nicholson, Mr D.M.  (2005) From a Flaw in the Knowledge Argument to a Physicalist Account of Qualia.  [Preprint]     
relation: http://cogprints.org/4020/