creators_name: Tirassa, Maurizio
type: journale
datestamp: 2004-04-07
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:55:31
metadata_visibility: show
title: Is consciousness necessary to high-level control systems?
ispublished: pub
subjects: bio-ani-cog
subjects: Psycoloquy
subjects: cog-psy
subjects: phil-mind
subjects: comp-sci-art-intel
full_text_status: public
keywords: Consciousness; Artificial intelligence; Robots; Control systems; Evolution
abstract: Building on Bringsjord's (1992, 1994) and Searle's (1992) work, I take it for granted that computational systems cannot be conscious. In order to discuss the possibility that they might be able to pass refined versions of the Turing Test, I consider three possible relationships between consciousness and control systems in human-level adaptive agents.
date: 1994
date_type: published
publication: PSYCOLOQUY
volume: 5
refereed: TRUE
referencetext: Bringsjord, S. (1992) What robots can and can't be. Boston: Kluwer Academic.
Bringsjord, S. (1994) Précis of: What robots can and can't be. PSYCOLOQUY 5(59) robot-consciousness.1. bringsjord.
Harnad, S. (1991) Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem. Minds and Machines 1:43-54.
Newell, A. (1990) Unified theories of cognition. Boston: Harvard University Press.
Pylyshyn, Z.W. (1984) Computation and cognition. Boston: MIT Press.
Searle, J.R. (1992) The rediscovery of the mind. Boston: MIT Press.
Turing, A.M. (1950) Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind 59:433-460.

citation:   Tirassa, Maurizio  (1994) Is consciousness necessary to high-level control systems?  [Journal (On-line/Unpaginated)]     
document_url: http://cogprints.org/3557/1/1994-Consciousness.pdf