creators_name: Guzeldere, Guven
creators_name: Aydede, Murat
type: journalp
datestamp: 1998-07-15
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:53:51
metadata_visibility: show
title: On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties
ispublished: pub
subjects: phil-mind
full_text_status: public
abstract: This is a commentary on Block' article article, "On a Confusion About a Concept of Consciousness," BBS (1995) 18:2. We argue that BlockÕs charge of fallacy remains ungrounded unless the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. How-ever, this depends on establishing the existence of "phenomenal properties" that, according to Block, are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block fails to make a case for the existence of P-consciousness so long as he fails to make a case for the existence of phenomenal properties so construed. We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and functional properties.
date: 1997
date_type: published
publication: Behavioral and Brain Sciences
volume: 20
number: 1
pagerange: 151-153
refereed: TRUE
citation:   Guzeldere, Guven and Aydede, Murat  (1997) On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties.  [Journal (Paginated)]     
document_url: http://cogprints.org/354/1/BBS.html