TY - GEN ID - cogprints354 UR - http://cogprints.org/354/ A1 - Guzeldere, Guven A1 - Aydede, Murat Y1 - 1997/// N2 - This is a commentary on Block' article article, "On a Confusion About a Concept of Consciousness," BBS (1995) 18:2. We argue that BlockÕs charge of fallacy remains ungrounded unless the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. How-ever, this depends on establishing the existence of "phenomenal properties" that, according to Block, are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block fails to make a case for the existence of P-consciousness so long as he fails to make a case for the existence of phenomenal properties so construed. We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and functional properties. TI - On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties SP - 151 AV - public EP - 153 ER -