title: On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties
creator: Guzeldere, Guven
creator: Aydede, Murat
subject: Philosophy of Mind
description: This is a commentary on Block' article article, "On a Confusion About a Concept of Consciousness," BBS (1995) 18:2. We argue that BlockÕs charge of fallacy remains ungrounded unless the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. How-ever, this depends on establishing the existence of "phenomenal properties" that, according to Block, are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block fails to make a case for the existence of P-consciousness so long as he fails to make a case for the existence of phenomenal properties so construed. We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and functional properties.
date: 1997
type: Journal (Paginated)
type: PeerReviewed
format: text/html
identifier: http://cogprints.org/354/1/BBS.html
identifier:   Guzeldere, Guven and Aydede, Murat  (1997) On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties.  [Journal (Paginated)]     
relation: http://cogprints.org/354/