1998-07-15Z2011-03-11T08:53:51Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/354This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/3541998-07-15ZOn the relation between phenomenal and representational propertiesThis is a commentary on Block' article article, "On a Confusion About a Concept of Consciousness," BBS (1995) 18:2. We argue that BlockÕs charge of fallacy remains ungrounded unless the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. How-ever, this depends on establishing the existence of "phenomenal properties" that, according to Block, are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block fails to make a case for the existence of P-consciousness so long as he fails to make a case for the existence of phenomenal properties so construed. We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and functional properties.Guven GuzeldereMurat Aydede