%A David J. Buller
%J Philosophy of Science
%T Individualism and Evolutionary Psychology (or: In Defense of 'Narrow' Functions)
%X Millikan and Wilson argue, for different reasons, that the essential reference to the environment in adaptationist explanations of behavior makes (psychological) individualism inconsistent with evolutionary psychology. I show that their arguments are based on misinterpretations of the role of reference to the environment in such explanations. By exploring these misinterpretations, I develop an account of explanation in evolutionary psychology that is fully consistent with individualism. This does not, however, constitute a full-fledged defense of individualism, since evolutionary psychology is only one explanatory paradigm among many in psychology.
%K individualism, behavioral ecology, function, etiological theory, proximate mechanisms, selection
%P 74-95
%V 64
%D 1997
%L cogprints328

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