%A Richard Horsey %J UCL Working Papers in Linguistics %T Psychosemantic analyticity %X It is widely agreed that the content of a logical concept such as and is constituted by the inferences it enters into. I argue that it is impossible to draw a principled distinction between logical and non-logical concepts, and hence that the content of non-logical concepts can also be constituted by certain of their inferential relations. The traditional problem with such a view has been that, given Quine?s arguments against the analytic-synthetic distinction, there does not seem to be any way to distinguish between those inferences that are content constitutive and those that are not. I propose that such a distinction can be drawn by appealing to a notion of ?psychosemantic analyticity?. This approach is immune to Quine?s arguments, since ?psychosemantic analyticity? is a psychological property, and it is thus an empirical question which inferences have this property. %D 2001 %K logical vocabulary analyticity %L cogprints3254 %V 13