title: Psychosemantic analyticity
creator: Horsey, Richard
subject: Philosophy of Mind
subject: Logic
subject: Pragmatics
description: It is widely agreed that the content of a logical concept such as and is constituted by the inferences it enters into. I argue that it is impossible to draw a principled distinction between logical and non-logical concepts, and hence that the content of non-logical concepts can also be constituted by certain of their inferential relations.  The traditional problem with such a view has been that, given Quine’s arguments against the analytic-synthetic distinction, there does not seem to be any way to distinguish between those inferences that are content constitutive and those that are not. I propose that such a distinction can be drawn by appealing to a notion of ‘psychosemantic analyticity’. This approach is immune to Quine’s arguments, since ‘psychosemantic analyticity’ is a psychological property, and it is thus an empirical question which inferences have this property.  
date: 2001-09
type: Journal (On-line/Unpaginated)
type: NonPeerReviewed
format: application/pdf
identifier: http://cogprints.org/3254/1/analytic.pdf
identifier:   Horsey, Richard  (2001) Psychosemantic analyticity.  [Journal (On-line/Unpaginated)]     
relation: http://cogprints.org/3254/