creators_name: Franceschi, Paul type: preprint datestamp: 2003-06-02 lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:55:17 metadata_visibility: show title: A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument subjects: phil-sci subjects: phil-metaphys full_text_status: public keywords: Doomsday argument, indeterminism, Bayes' theorem abstract: In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument based on a third type of solution, by contrast to on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and on the other hand, the Eckhardt et al. analysis. The present line of thought is based on the fact that both aforementioned analyses are based on an inaccurate analogy. After discussing the imperfections of both models, I present then a two-sided model that fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to DA and encapsulates both Carter-Leslie's and Eckhardt et al.'s models. I argue then that this new analogy also holds when one takes into account the issue of indeterminism and the reference class problem. This leads finally to a novel formulation of the argument that could well be more consensual than the original one. date: 2003-05 date_type: published refereed: TRUE referencetext: Bostrom, N. (1997) 'Investigations into the Doomsday argument', Preprint at http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/inv/investigations.html Bostrom, N. (2002) Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy, New York, Routledge Chambers, T. (2001) 'Do Doomsday's Proponents Think We Were Born Yesterday?', Philosophy, 76, 443-50 Delahaye, J-P. (1996) 'Recherche de modèles pour l’argument de l’apocalypse de Carter-Leslie', unpublished manuscript Eckhardt, W. (1993) 'Probability Theory and the Doomsday Argument', Mind, 102, 483-88 Eckhardt, W. (1997) 'A Shooting-Room view of Doomsday', Journal of Philosophy, 94, 244-259 Franceschi, P. (1998) 'Une solution pour l'argument de l'apocalypse', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 28, 227-46 Franceschi, P. (1999) 'Comment l'urne de Carter et Leslie se déverse dans celle de Hempel', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 29, 139-56, English translation at http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints Franceschi, P. (2002) Une application des n-univers à l'argument de l'Apocalypse et au paradoxe de Goodman, doctoral dissertation Hájek, A. (2002) 'Interpretations of Probability', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2002 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/probability-interpret Korb, K. & Oliver, J. (1998) 'A Refutation of the Doomsday Argument', Mind, 107, 403–10 Leslie, J. (1992) 'Time and the Anthropic Principle', Mind, 101, 521-40 Leslie, J. (1993) 'Doom and Probabilities', Mind, 102, 489-91 Leslie, J. (1996) The End of the World: the science and ethics of human extinction, London, Routledge Sober, E. (2003) 'An Empirical Critique of Two Versions of the Doomsday Argument - Gott’s Line and Leslie’s Wedge', Synthese, 135-3, 415-30 Sowers, G. F. (2002) 'The Demise of the Doomsday Argument', Mind, 111, 37-45 citation: Franceschi, Paul (2003) A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument. [Preprint] document_url: http://cogprints.org/2990/1/doomsday-en.pdf