%A Daniel C. Dennett
%J Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
%T Commentary on Cam
%X In "Propositions about Images" Philip Cam accurately analyzes and criticizes the grounds I gave, in the works he cites, for my denial that we have privileged access (of any sort) to anything deserving to be called a mental image. He shows that I did not deal properly with the question of how I would interpret the ostensive force of "this" and "that" in an introspective judgment of the sort: "Now it looks like this and now it looks like that." What can one be ostending or referring to in such a case, if not to an image (or some feature of an image)?
%D 1987
%P 339-41
%L cogprints251
%V XLVIII

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