TY - GEN ID - cogprints2235 UR - http://cogprints.org/2235/ A1 - Carruthers, Peter Y1 - 2002/// N2 - Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Many people argue not. They claim that there is an 'explanatory gap' between physical and/or intentional states and processes, on the one hand, and phenomenal consciousness, on the other. I reply that, since we have purely recognitional concepts of experience, there is indeed a sort of gap at the level of concepts; but this need not mean that the properties picked out by those concepts are inexplicable. I show how dispositionalist higher-order thought (HOT) theory can reductively explain the subjective feel of experience by deploying a form of 'consumer semantics'. First-order perceptual contents become transformed, acquiring a dimension of subjectivity, by virtue to their availability to a mind-reading (HOT generating) consumer system. PB - Cambridge University Press KW - phenomenal consciousness higher-order experience consciousness higher-order thought TI - Consciousness: explaining the phenomena. SP - 61 AV - public EP - 85 ER -