@misc{cogprints2235, editor = {Denis Walsh}, title = {Consciousness: explaining the phenomena.}, author = {Peter Carruthers}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2002}, pages = {61--85}, journal = {Naturalism, Evolution and Mind.}, keywords = {phenomenal consciousness higher-order experience consciousness higher-order thought}, url = {http://cogprints.org/2235/}, abstract = {Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Many people argue not. They claim that there is an 'explanatory gap' between physical and/or intentional states and processes, on the one hand, and phenomenal consciousness, on the other. I reply that, since we have purely recognitional concepts of experience, there is indeed a sort of gap at the level of concepts; but this need not mean that the properties picked out by those concepts are inexplicable. I show how dispositionalist higher-order thought (HOT) theory can reductively explain the subjective feel of experience by deploying a form of 'consumer semantics'. First-order perceptual contents become transformed, acquiring a dimension of subjectivity, by virtue to their availability to a mind-reading (HOT generating) consumer system.} }