2001-12-14Z2011-03-11T08:54:51Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1982This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/19822001-12-14ZProblems in the "functional" investigations of consciousnessThis article presents the view that the problem of consciousness per definition can not be seen as a strictly scientific or strictly philosophical problem. The first idea, especially, leads to important difficulties: First of all, the idea has in most cases implied some rather superficial reductionistic or functionalistic a priori assumptions, and, secondly, it can be shown that some of the most commonly used empirical methods in these regards are inadequate. Especially so in the case of contrastive analysis, widely used in cognitive neuroscience. However, this criticism does not lead to the conclusion that scientific methods are inadequate as such, only that they always work on a pre-established background of theory, of which one must be explicit.Morten Overgaard