title: Evolving cooperation in the non-iterated prisoner's dilemma: The importance of spatial organization
creator: Oliphant, M.
subject: Animal Behavior
subject: Animal Cognition
subject: Ethology
subject: Evolution
subject: Population Biology
subject: Sociobiology
subject: Social Psychology
description: Most work on evolving cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma treats the non-iterated game as an undesirable simple case that should be risen above. It has been taken as a given that populations evolving to play the non-iterated game will always converge on defection. This paper questions this assumption, and demonstrates that organizing a population spatially dramatically changes the nature of the game and allows cooperation to emerge.
publisher: MIT Press
contributor: Brooks, R. and Maes
date: 1998
type: Conference Paper
type: NonPeerReviewed
format: application/postscript
identifier: http://cogprints.org/170/2/pd.ps
identifier:   Oliphant, M.  (1998) Evolving cooperation in the non-iterated prisoner's dilemma: The importance of spatial organization.  [Conference Paper]     
relation: http://cogprints.org/170/