%A Gerard O'Brien
%J Acta Analytica
%T Connectionism, Analogicity and Mental Content
%X In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson (1996) argue that cognitive
processes, pace classicism, are not governed by exceptionless, ?representation-level? rules; they
are instead the work of defeasible cognitive tendencies subserved by the non-linear dynamics of
the brain?s neural networks. Many theorists are sympathetic with the dynamical characterisation
of connectionism and the general (re)conception of cognition that it affords. But in all the
excitement surrounding the connectionist revolution in cognitive science, it has largely gone
unnoticed that connectionism adds to the traditional focus on computational processes, a new
focus ? one on the vehicles of mental representation, on the entities that carry content through the
mind. Indeed, if Horgan and Tienson?s dynamical characterisation of connectionism is on the
right track, then so intimate is the relationship between computational processes and
representational vehicles, that connectionist cognitive science is committed to a resemblance
theory of mental content.
%K phenomenal consciousness, connectionism, mental representation, vehicle theory of consciousness, process theory of consciousness, philosophy of mind
%P 111-131
%V 22
%D 1998
%I Roll Verlag
%L cogprints1675

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