creators_name: Harnad, Stevan type: journale datestamp: 2001-06-26 lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:54:43 metadata_visibility: show title: The Convergence Argument in Mind-Modelling: Scaling Up from Toyland to the Total Turing Test ispublished: pub subjects: cog-psy full_text_status: public keywords: artificial intelligence, behaviorism, cognitive science, computationalism, Fodor, functionalism, Searle, Turing Machine, Turing Test. abstract: The Turing Test is just a methodological constraint forcing us to scale up to an organisms' full functional capacity. This is still just an epistemic matter, not an ontic one. Even a candidate in which we have successfully reverse-engineered all human capacities is not guaranteed to have a mind. 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Cognoscenti 1: 18-20 citation: Harnad, Stevan (2000) The Convergence Argument in Mind-Modelling: Scaling Up from Toyland to the Total Turing Test. [Journal (On-line/Unpaginated)] document_url: http://cogprints.org/1649/1/psyc.00.11.078.ai-cognitive-science.18.harnad