"1625","There Is Only One Mind/Body Problem","In our century a Frege/Brentano wedge has gradually been driven into the mind/body problem so deeply that it appears to have split it into two: The problem of \"qualia\" and the problem of \"intentionality.\" Both problems use similar intuition pumps: For qualia, we imagine a robot that is indistinguishable from us in every objective respect, but it lacks subjective experiences; it is mindless. For intentionality, we again imagine a robot that is indistinguishable from us in every objective respect but its \"thoughts\" lack \"aboutness\"; they are meaningless. I will try to show that there is a way to re-unify the mind/body problem by grounding the \"language of thought\" (symbols) in our perceptual categorization capacity. The model is bottom-up and hybrid symbolic/nonsymbolic.  ","http://cogprints.org/1625/","Harnad, Stevan","UNSPECIFIED","       <span class=\"person_name\">Harnad, Stevan</span>     (1992)  <a href=\"http://cogprints.org/1625/\"><em>There Is Only One Mind/Body Problem.</em></a>       [Conference Paper]         (Unpublished)   ","","1992"
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