title: There Is Only One Mind/Body Problem
creator: Harnad, Stevan
subject: Cognitive Psychology
subject: Philosophy of Mind
description: In our century a Frege/Brentano wedge has gradually been driven into the mind/body problem so deeply that it appears to have split it into two: The problem of "qualia" and the problem of "intentionality." Both problems use similar intuition pumps: For qualia, we imagine a robot that is indistinguishable from us in every objective respect, but it lacks subjective experiences; it is mindless. For intentionality, we again imagine a robot that is indistinguishable from us in every objective respect but its "thoughts" lack "aboutness"; they are meaningless. I will try to show that there is a way to re-unify the mind/body problem by grounding the "language of thought" (symbols) in our perceptual categorization capacity. The model is bottom-up and hybrid symbolic/nonsymbolic.  
date: 1992
type: Conference Paper
type: NonPeerReviewed
format: text/html
identifier: http://cogprints.org/1625/1/harnadXX.one.mind.body.problem.html
identifier:   Harnad, Stevan  (1992) There Is Only One Mind/Body Problem.  [Conference Paper]    (Unpublished)  
relation: http://cogprints.org/1625/

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