--- abstract: 'A robot that is functionally indistinguishable from us may or may not be a mindless Zombie. There will never be any way to know, yet its functional principles will be as close as we can ever get to explaining the mind. ' altloc: - http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad95.zombies.html chapter: ~ commentary: ~ commref: ~ confdates: ~ conference: ~ confloc: ~ contact_email: ~ creators_id: [] creators_name: - family: Harnad given: Stevan honourific: '' lineage: '' date: 1995 date_type: published datestamp: 2001-06-19 department: ~ dir: disk0/00/00/16/01 edit_lock_since: ~ edit_lock_until: 0 edit_lock_user: ~ editors_id: [] editors_name: [] eprint_status: archive eprintid: 1601 fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png;/1601/2/harnad95.zombies.pdf|/style/images/fileicons/text_html.png;/1601/6/harnad95.zombies.html full_text_status: public importid: ~ institution: ~ isbn: ~ ispublished: pub issn: ~ item_issues_comment: [] item_issues_count: 0 item_issues_description: [] item_issues_id: [] item_issues_reported_by: [] item_issues_resolved_by: [] item_issues_status: [] item_issues_timestamp: [] item_issues_type: [] keywords: 'consciousness, reverse engineering, other-minds problem, bind/body problem, zombies, functionalism, epiphenomenalism, causality' lastmod: 2011-05-02 12:18:19 latitude: ~ longitude: ~ metadata_visibility: show note: ~ number: ~ pagerange: 164-167 pubdom: FALSE publication: Journal of Consciousness Studies publisher: ~ refereed: TRUE referencetext: "Harnad, S. (1982) Consciousness: An afterthought. Cognition and Brain Theory 5: 29 - 47. \r\n\r\nHarnad, S. (1984) What are the scope and limits of radical behaviorist theory? The Behavioral and\r\nBrain Sciences 7: 720 -721. \r\n\r\nHarnad, S. (1989) Minds, Machines and Searle. Journal of Theoretical and Experimental Artificial\r\nIntelligence 1: 5-25. \r\n\r\nHarnad, S. (1990) The Symbol Grounding Problem. Physica D 42: 335-346. [Reprinted in Hungarian\r\nTranslation as \"A Szimbolum-Lehorgonyzas Problemaja.\" Magyar Pszichologiai Szemle\r\nXLVIII-XLIX (32-33) 5-6: 365-383.] \r\n\r\nHarnad, S. (1991) Other bodies, Other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem.\r\nMinds and Machines 1: 43-54. \r\n\r\nHarnad, S. (1992) Connecting Object to Symbol in Modeling Cognition. In: A. Clarke and R. Lutz\r\n(Eds) Connectionism in Context Springer Verlag. \r\n\r\nHarnad, S. (1992) The Turing Test Is Not A Trick: Turing Indistinguishability Is A Scientific\r\nCriterion. SIGART Bulletin 3(4) (October) 9 - 10. \r\n\r\nHayes, P., Harnad, S., Perlis, D. & Block, N. (1992) Virtual Symposium on Virtual Mind. Minds and\r\nMachines 2: 217-238. \r\n\r\nHarnad, S. (1993) Grounding Symbols in the Analog World with Neural Nets. Think 2(1) 12 - 78\r\n(Special issue on \"Connectionism versus Symbolism,\" D.M.W. Powers & P.A. Flach, eds.). [Also\r\nreprinted in French translation as: \"L'Ancrage des Symboles dans le Monde Analogique a l'aide de\r\nReseaux Neuronaux: un Modele Hybride.\" In: Rialle V. et Payette D. (Eds) La Modelisation.\r\nLEKTON, Vol IV, No 2.] \r\n\r\nHarnad, S. (1993) Artificial Life: Synthetic Versus Virtual. Artificial Life III. Proceedings, Santa Fe\r\nInstitute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity. Volume XVI. \r\n\r\nHarnad, S. (1993) Symbol Grounding is an Empirical Problem: Neural Nets are Just a Candidate\r\nComponent. Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. NJ:\r\nErlbaum \r\n\r\nHarnad, S. (1993) Problems, Problems: The Frame Problem as a Symptom of the Symbol Grounding\r\nProblem. PSYCOLOQUY 4(34) frame-problem.11. \r\n\r\nHarnad S. (1993) Discussion (passim) In: Bock, G.R. & Marsh, J. (Eds.) Experimental and\r\nTheoretical Studies of Consciousness. CIBA Foundation Symposium 174. Chichester: Wiley \r\n\r\nHarnad, S. (1993) Turing Indistinguishability and the Blind Watchmaker. Presented at Conference on\r\n\"Evolution and the Human Sciences\" London School of Economics Centre for the Philosophy of the\r\nNatural and Social Sciences 24 - 26 June 1993. \r\n\r\nHarnad, S. (1993) Grounding Symbolic Capacity in Robotic Capacity. In: Steels, L. and R. Brooks\r\n(eds.) The \"artificial life\" route to \"artificial intelligence.\" Building Situated Embodied Agents. New\r\nHaven: Lawrence Erlbaum \r\n\r\nHarnad, S, (1994) Does the Mind Piggy-Back on Robotic and Symbolic Capacity? To appear in: H.\r\nMorowitz (ed.) \"The Mind, the Brain, and Complex Adaptive Systems. \r\n\r\nHarnad, S. (1994) Levels of Functional Equivalence in Reverse Bioengineering: The Darwinian Turing\r\nTest for Artificial Life. Artificial Life 1(3): 293-301. \r\n\r\nHarnad S, (1994) The Convergence Argument in Mind-Modelling: Scaling Up from Toyland to the\r\nTotal Turing Test. Cognoscenti 1: \r\n\r\nHarnad, S. (1994) Computation Is Just Interpretable Symbol Manipulation: Cognition Isn't. Special\r\nIssue on \"What Is Computation\" Minds and Machines (in press) " relation_type: [] relation_uri: [] reportno: ~ rev_number: 35 series: ~ source: ~ status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:38:57 subjects: - cog-psy - phil-mind succeeds: ~ suggestions: ~ sword_depositor: ~ sword_slug: ~ thesistype: ~ title: Why and How We Are Not Zombies type: journalp userid: 63 volume: 1