--- abstract: |- To summarize, if we speak only about the information available in an object or a data structure -- and forget for now that we have mental lives at all, concerning ourselves only with our performance capacities -- it seems clear that array representations are merely another form of symbolic information. Are they likely to be the only form of internal representation, or the main one, that explains our visual and spatial capacities? I think not; I think tasks like Shepard & Cooper's (1982) ``mental rotation'' may be better accounted for by internal representations that do not turn transducer projections into numbers at all, but preserve them in analog form, one that is physically invertible by an analog transformation that is one-to-one with the transducer projection (to some subsensory and subcognitive level of neural granularity). In other words, I agree with Glasgow that it is a matter of preserving information in the internal representation, but I am not persuaded that arrays are the form the preserved information takes (see Camberlain & Barlow 1982; Jeannerod 1994). altloc: [] chapter: ~ commentary: ~ commref: 'J.I. Glasgow: "The Imagery Debate Revisited."' confdates: ~ conference: ~ confloc: ~ contact_email: ~ creators_id: [] creators_name: - family: Harnad given: Stevan honourific: '' lineage: '' date: 1993 date_type: published datestamp: 2001-06-18 department: ~ dir: disk0/00/00/15/90 edit_lock_since: ~ edit_lock_until: ~ edit_lock_user: ~ editors_id: [] editors_name: [] eprint_status: archive eprintid: 1590 fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/text_html.png;/1590/1/harnad93.imagery.html full_text_status: public importid: ~ institution: ~ isbn: ~ ispublished: pub issn: ~ item_issues_comment: [] item_issues_count: 0 item_issues_description: [] item_issues_id: [] item_issues_reported_by: [] item_issues_resolved_by: [] item_issues_status: [] item_issues_timestamp: [] item_issues_type: [] keywords: 'arrays, mental images, symbols' lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:54:41 latitude: ~ longitude: ~ metadata_visibility: show note: ~ number: 4 pagerange: 309-333 pubdom: FALSE publication: Computational Intelligence publisher: ~ refereed: TRUE referencetext: |-2 CHAMBERLAIN, S.C. & BARLOW, R.B. 1982. Retinotopic organization of lateral eye input to Limulus brain. Journal of Neurophysiology, 48: 505-520. HARNAD, S. 1982. Consciousness: An afterthought. Cognition and Brain Theory, 5: 29 - 47. HARNAD, S. 1987. The induction and representation of categories. In: Harnad, S. (ed.) Categorical Perception: The Groundwork of Cognition. New York: Cambridge University Press. HARNAD, S. 1990a. The symbol grounding problem. Physica D, 42: 335-346. HARNAD, S. 1990b. Against computational hermeneutics, Invited commentary on Eric Dietrich's computationalism. Social Epistemology, 4: 167-172. HARNAD, S. 1990c. Lost in the hermeneutic hall of mirrors, Invited commentary on Michael Dyer's ``Minds, machines, Searle and Harnad''. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 2: 321 - 327. HARNAD, S. 1991. Other bodies, Other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem. Minds and Machines, 1: 43-54. HARNAD, S. 1992. Connecting Object to Symbol in Modeling Cognition. In: A. Clarke and R. Lutz (Eds) Connectionism in Context Springer Verlag. JEANNEROD, M. 1994. The representing brain: neural correlates of motor intention and imagery. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17(2) in press. SEARLE, J. R. 1980. Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3: 417-457. SHEPARD, R. N. and L. A. COOPER. 1982. Mental images and their transformations. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. relation_type: [] relation_uri: [] reportno: ~ rev_number: 8 series: ~ source: ~ status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:38:52 subjects: - percep-cog-psy succeeds: ~ suggestions: ~ sword_depositor: ~ sword_slug: ~ thesistype: ~ title: Exorcizing the Ghost of Mental Imagery type: journalp userid: 63 volume: 9