creators_name: Hayes, Patrick
creators_name: Harnad, Stevan
creators_name: Perlis, Donald
creators_name: Block, Ned
type: journalp
datestamp: 2001-06-18
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:54:41
metadata_visibility: show
title: Virtual Symposium on Virtual Mind
ispublished: pub
subjects: cog-psy
subjects: comp-sci-art-intel
subjects: phil-mind
full_text_status: public
keywords: Chinese Room Argument; Searle; Turing Test; computationalism; functionalism; hermeneutics;
implementation; mind; other-minds problem; robotics; semantics; symbol grounding; virtual reality. 

abstract: When certain formal symbol systems (e.g., computer programs) are implemented as dynamic physical symbol
systems (e.g., when they are run on a computer) their activity can be interpreted at higher levels (e.g., binary code can be
interpreted as LISP, LISP code can be interpreted as English, and English can be interpreted as a meaningful conversation).
These higher levels of interpretability are called "virtual" systems. If such a virtual system is interpretable as if it had a mind, is
such a "virtual mind" real? This is the question addressed in this "virtual" symposium, originally conducted electronically among
four cognitive scientists: Donald Perlis, a computer scientist, argues that according to the computationalist thesis, virtual minds are
real and hence Searle's Chinese Room Argument fails, because if Searle memorized and executed a program that could pass the
Turing Test in Chinese he would have a second, virtual, Chinese-understanding mind of which he was unaware (as in multiple
personality). Stevan Harnad, a psychologist, argues that Searle's Argument is valid, virtual minds are just hermeneutic
overinterpretations, and symbols must be grounded in the real world of objects, not just the virtual world of interpretations.
Computer scientist Patrick Hayes argues that Searle's Argument fails, but because Searle does not really implement the program:
A real implementation must not be homuncular but mindless and mechanical, like a computer. Only then can it give rise to a mind
at the virtual level. Philosopher Ned Block suggests that there is no reason a mindful implementation would not be a real one. 

date: 1992
date_type: published
publication: Minds and Machines
volume: 2
number: 3
pagerange: 217-238
refereed: TRUE
referencetext: 
Harnad, S. (1989) Minds, Machines and Searle. Journal of Theoretical and Experimental Artificial Intelligence 1: 5-25. 

Harnad, S. (1990a) The Symbol Grounding Problem. Physica D 42: 335-346. 

Harnad, S. (1990b) Lost in the hermeneutic hall of mirrors. Invited Commentary on: Michael Dyer: Minds, Machines, Searle and
Harnad. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 2: 321 - 327. 

Harnad, S. (1991) Other bodies, Other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem. Minds and Machines 1:
43-54. 

Harnad, S. (1992) Connecting Object to Symbol in Modeling Cognition. In: A. Clarke and R. Lutz (Eds) Connectionism in
Context Springer Verlag. 

Maudlin, T. (1989) Computation and Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy LXXXVI (8): 407-432 

Putnam, H. (1975) Mind, Language and Reality. Cambridge University Press. 

Searle, J. R. (1980) Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 417-457. 

Searle, J. R. (1990) Is the Brain a Digital Computer? Presidential Address. Proceedings of the American Philsophical Association.
citation:   Hayes, Patrick and Harnad, Stevan and Perlis, Donald and Block, Ned  (1992) Virtual Symposium on Virtual Mind.  [Journal (Paginated)]     
document_url: http://cogprints.org/1585/1/harnad92.virtualmind.html