--- abstract: | Explaining the mind by building machines with minds runs into the other-minds problem: How can we tell whether any body other than our own has a mind when the only way to know is by being the other body? In practice we all use some form of Turing Test: If it can do everything a body with a mind can do such that we can't tell them apart, we have no basis for doubting it has a mind. But what is "everything" a body with a mind can do? Turing's original "pen-pal" version (the TT) only tested linguistic capacity, but Searle has shown that a mindless symbol-manipulator could pass the TT undetected. The Total Turing Test (TTT) calls for all of our linguistic and robotic capacities; immune to Searle's argument, it suggests how to ground a symbol manipulating system in the capacity to pick out the objects its symbols refer to. No Turing Test, however, can guarantee that a body has a mind. Worse, nothing in the explanation of its successful performance requires a model to have a mind at all. Minds are hence very different from the unobservables of physics (e.g., superstrings); and Turing Testing, though essential for machine-modeling the mind, can really only yield an explanation of the body. altloc: - http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad91.otherminds.html chapter: ~ commentary: ~ commref: ~ confdates: ~ conference: ~ confloc: ~ contact_email: ~ creators_id: [] creators_name: - family: Harnad given: Stevan honourific: '' lineage: '' date: 1991 date_type: published datestamp: 2001-06-18 department: ~ dir: disk0/00/00/15/78 edit_lock_since: ~ edit_lock_until: ~ edit_lock_user: ~ editors_id: [] editors_name: [] eprint_status: archive eprintid: 1578 fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/text_html.png;/1578/1/harnad91.otherminds.html full_text_status: public importid: ~ institution: ~ isbn: ~ ispublished: pub issn: ~ item_issues_comment: [] item_issues_count: 0 item_issues_description: [] item_issues_id: [] item_issues_reported_by: [] item_issues_resolved_by: [] item_issues_status: [] item_issues_timestamp: [] item_issues_type: [] keywords: |- artificial intelligence; causality; cognition; computation; explanation; mind/body problem; other-minds problem; robotics; Searle; symbol grounding; Turing Test. lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:54:40 latitude: ~ longitude: ~ metadata_visibility: show note: ~ number: ~ pagerange: 43-54 pubdom: FALSE publication: Minds and Machines publisher: ~ refereed: TRUE referencetext: |-2 Alcock, J. 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(1980) Computers, cognition and philosophy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 449-450. relation_type: [] relation_uri: [] reportno: ~ rev_number: 8 series: ~ source: ~ status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:38:47 subjects: - cog-psy - comp-sci-art-intel - phil-mind succeeds: ~ suggestions: ~ sword_depositor: ~ sword_slug: ~ thesistype: ~ title: 'Other bodies, Other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem' type: journalp userid: 63 volume: 1