TY - GEN ID - cogprints1466 UR - http://cogprints.org/1466/ A1 - O'Brien, Gerard A1 - Opie, Jon Y1 - 1999/// N2 - The connectionist vehicle theory of phenomenal experience in the target article identifies consciousness with the brain?s explicit representation of information in the form of stable patterns of neural activity. Commentators raise concerns about both the conceptual and empirical adequacy of this proposal. On the former front they worry about our reliance on vehicles, on representation, on stable patterns of activity, and on our identity claim. On the latter front their concerns range from the general plausibility of a vehicle theory to our specific attempts to deal with the dissociation studies. We address these concerns, and then finish by considering whether the vehicle theory we have defended has a coherent story to tell about the active, unified subject to whom conscious experiences belong. PB - Cambridge University Press KW - connectionism KW - phenomenal experience KW - classicism KW - vehicle theory of consciousness KW - process theory of consciousness KW - philosophy of mind KW - dissociation KW - mental representation TI - Putting Content into a Vehicle Theory of Consciousness SP - 175 AV - public EP - 196 ER -